

# Prevention of Violent Extremism in Jordan:

## How to strengthen the OPEV network?

**Policy Paper**  
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## Executive Summary

Violent Extremism (VE) has been a rising concern for the international community as a threat to peace and stability all around the globe. Jordan in particular, has been a focus of attention due to risky internal and external conditions, drawn from a volatile regional context.

The present policy paper assesses the current state of the Observatory for the Prevention of Extremist Violence (OPEV) network in Jordan in order to provide with useful recommendations for its strengthening. The recommendations are based on a theoretical framework and a contextualization, as well as a diagnosis through a PESL and a SWOT analysis. Data has been obtained from both secondary and primary sources, such as periodic consultations with the OPEV's coordinators and questionnaires conducted among key civil society organizations working in prevention of violent extremism (PVE) in Jordan, including OPEV members.

Results show that civil society has a key role to play in PVE efforts in Jordan, but it is encountering some challenges to carry out its work. Many of those arise from the political environment, and specifically from the recent restrictions on civil society posed by the 2014 AntiTerror Law.

OPEV in particular is a network made up by civil society organizations that by acting together have a high potential to make an important contribution in PVE terms. OPEV's broad understanding of VE together with a focus on its prevention make the network specially suited for addressing the complex, multiple and interconnected manifestations that VE takes in the Jordanian context. However, the aforementioned external challenges as well as several internal weaknesses should be addressed in order to strengthen the network's role.

This policy paper provides with twelve recommendations to contribute to that goal, dealing with those areas where the problem diagnosis has identified room for improvement. Recommendations address the following topics: Members' nature, mission and values; Strategy (for the network, vis-à-vis the State, vis-à-vis other stakeholders); Capacity; Decision-making; Internal Dynamics and Perception; Internal Communication; External Communication and Visibility; and Membership Expansion.

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ARDD	Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CT	Counter Terrorism
FAL	Anna Lindh Foundation
GID	Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOVACT	International Institute for Non-Violent Action
OPEV	Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism
PESL	Political, Economic, Social, and Legal Factors Analysis
P/CVE	Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
SAP	Structural Adjustment Plans
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats Analysis
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US	United States
VE	Violent Extremism



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# **Prevention of Violent Extremism in Jordan:**

## How to strengthen the OPEV network?

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## I. Introduction

Violent Extremism (VE) has been a rising concern for the international community as a threat to peace and stability all around the globe. Jordan, in the midst of regional turmoil, has drawn special attention as a country facing risky conditions due to both the presence of violent extremist militias in the neighboring territories and a series of internal challenges and conditions understood as potentially conducive to violent extremist ideologies and behaviors for certain individuals or groups. However, Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) efforts in Jordan have been strongly linked to securitized responses and counter-terror policies, having counterproductive effects in terms of human rights violations and restrictions of political and civil freedoms. Civil society, which is acknowledged to have an essential role in addressing VE, has often been kept out of state endeavors, having to act in a particularly restrained environment. Further, PVE efforts have tended to focus solely on violent Jihadi-salafist movements, disregarding the multiplicity of expressions that VE takes in the Jordanian society, and ignoring the fact that VE in Jordan is not only fed by non-state actors but also by state-based ones.

In this context, grass-root civil society initiatives like the Observatory for the Prevention of Extremist Violence (OPEV), prove to have a key role to play. As a network of civil society organizations working in PVE issues in Jordan, OPEV is well-placed to act as a bridge between local communities and state policy. Specially, OPEV's understanding of VE ideologies as based in "totalitarian, fanatic, intolerant, patriarchal, anti-democratic and anti-pluralistic values"<sup>1</sup> that can be adopted by individuals, groups, corporations or states, as well as the acknowledgment that it "does not arise in a vacuum"<sup>2</sup> represent a comprehensive approach to VE of high value for the Jordanian society.

Despite its added value, OPEV Jordan's potential to arise as an alternative voice to PVE efforts is being lost. An analysis of both the internal dynamics and the contextual conditions has determined that several internal weaknesses on the network's structure, as well as the delicate and sometimes hostile political environment in which it operates, are preventing it from taking full advantage of its possibilities. Therefore, the present policy paper assesses the

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<sup>1</sup> "The Problem." Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. Accessed May 4, 2018. <http://opev.org/the-problem/>

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: report of the Secretary General*. A/70/674 p.1 (December 2015) available from: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/undp-ogc/documents/SG%20PVE%20plan%20of%20action.pdf>



current state of the network to later provide with useful recommendations for its strengthening.

The policy paper has been structured in the following way. First of all, a theoretical framework serves as an introduction to VE phenomena and the existing responses to it, including counter-terrorism (CT), and countering and prevention of VE (C/PVE). It also explores literature on civil society and its role in PVE. Second, the specificities of the Jordanian context including the identification of the main forms of VE present in the country, as well as a mapping of the relevant actors addressing VE is presented in the form of a contextualization. Third, the current state of OPEV Jordan is assessed through a PESL and SWOT analysis which serve as a basis to identify risks in the former and weaknesses, threats, strengths and opportunities in the later. Fourth, a series of recommendations on how to strengthen and foster the role of the OPEV Jordan are presented. Finally, the main contributions as well as future possible applications of the policy paper are explored in the conclusions.

Regarding the methodology, in order to recompile the necessary data, both secondary and primary sources have been used. Secondary sources include a literature review upon which the theoretical framework has been elaborated as well as a desk review which has nurtured the contextualization and the mapping of actors. Concerning primary sources, these have consisted of consultations with OPEV Coordinators from the International Institute for Non-Violent Action (NOVACT),<sup>3</sup> a series of questionnaires conducted among Jordanian civil society organizations, as well as interviews with network experts, namely the project coordinator of EuroMeSCo and the coordinator of Anna Lindh Foundation in Spain. Primary sources have served as the basis for the problem identification and recommendations' design.

The consultations with NOVACT Coordinators have been done on a regular basis and included weekly meetings with NOVACT's Country Representative in Jordan and NOVACT's Mashreq Area Coordinator. Information was also gathered from the attendance to a regional meeting that took place the 11th May of 2018, which gathered OPEV Barcelona, Tunisia and Jordan, and where NOVACT's director and coordinators were present. With regards to the questionnaires, these have been conducted among both OPEV Jordan member organizations' representatives as well as among other key civil society actors working on PVE in Jordan identified throughout the mapping of actors section.

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<sup>3</sup> See *Annex 4: Contacts* for further details.

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## II. Theoretical framework

### ❖ Violent Extremism and its Prevention

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The concept of VE was established in “official political jargon” in the beginnings of 2015 after a *Countering VE (CVE)<sup>4</sup> Summit* in the White House<sup>5</sup> and the UN announcement of its “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.”<sup>6</sup> “By popularising the term violent extremism, the policymakers who introduced it wanted to shed the political baggage that was associated with the word terrorism.”<sup>7</sup>

While terrorism<sup>8</sup> understood from a Critical Terrorism Studies perspective is closer to the concept of VE, encompassing violence committed by both state and non-state actors, the word had such a political burden that it was only related to certain communities and violent practices, letting out of its scope many other forms of violence. “Different bodies, organizations and government agencies have different definitions to suit their own particular role, purpose or bias,”<sup>9</sup> thus, terrorism will remain a “contested concept” since the definitional question “cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency.”<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Traditional CVE contemplates preventing and combating VE only as, and when, conducive to terrorism. Unlike CT, CVE recognizes the importance of not only addressing the acts of violence per se but also the drivers and conditions conducive to it. However, “CVE, like CT, has been driven by top-down approaches that, inherently, favor hard power” and that focus on non-state actors as main perpetrators of violence. Anne Aly, Anne-Marie Balbi & Carmen Jacques “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society.” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (2015): 3-13. doi:10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772

<sup>5</sup> Christian Nünlist, Owen Frazer. “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism” *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, No.183. (2015) <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: report of the Secretary General*. A/70/674 (December 2015) available from: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/undp-ogc/documents/SG%20PVE%20plan%20of%20action.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Peter R. Neumann, “Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region.” OSCE (September 2017), p.15 <http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841?download=true>

<sup>8</sup> Terrorism will be understood according to the definition provided by Alex Schmid in 1980 which derived from sixteen elements agreed by a number of academia experts on terrorism: “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby, in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chose randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main targets (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought”.

Alex Schmid, Terrorism - The Definitional Problem, 36 *Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.* 375 (2004) p.382 <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1400&context=jil>

<sup>9</sup> Gregor Bruce, “Definition of Terrorism Social and Political Effects” *Journal of Military and Veteran's Health*, Volume 21 No II. (2013), p. 26 <http://jmvh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Definition-of-Terrorism.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Alex Schmid, Terrorism - The Definitional Problem, 36 *Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.* 375 (2004) p.402 <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1400&context=jil>

VE appears as an alternative to the much-criticized concept of terrorism, “covering not just terrorist attacks but the whole range of violent actions that extremist groups have been responsible for [...] and which many definitions of terrorism failed to capture.”<sup>11</sup>

However, as with the term terrorism, there is no universally accepted definition of VE, remaining “unclear, ill-defined and elusive” in the existing literature, which “employs the concept in a way that suggests it is self-evident and self-explanatory.”<sup>12</sup> VE is “usually considered to be a more inclusive term than terrorism,”<sup>13</sup> but not even among institutions such as the UN, the EU or NATO does consensus exist, meaning that the distinction between VE and terrorism “remains an evolving concept”<sup>14</sup> and that terrorism and VE are used sometimes interchangeably,<sup>15</sup> with some critics regarding VE as a “cosmetic replacement for the highly politicized term “terrorism.”<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, though VE used as a substitute of terrorism in a war on terror discourse is a synonym of terrorism, it may not be in another context. VE “accommodates any kind of violence as long as its motivation is deemed extremist,”<sup>17</sup> therefore terrorism is just one of the many shapes VE can take. VE acts can be committed by both state and non-state actors and includes forms of VE which tend to be overlooked such as hate speech, hate crimes, gender-based violence, state torture and even conventional military operations.

The main difference with terrorism though, does not lie in the concept itself but in the approach. As UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon pointed out, “Missiles may kill terrorists.

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<sup>11</sup> Peter R. Neumann, “Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region.” OSCE (September 2017), p.15 <http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841?download=true>

<sup>12</sup> Minerva Nasser-Eddine, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostino, Gilbert Caluya. “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review” *Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, Australian Government Department of Defense* (2014). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235024824\\_Countering\\_Violent\\_Extremism\\_CVE\\_Literature\\_Review](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235024824_Countering_Violent_Extremism_CVE_Literature_Review)

<sup>13</sup> Andrew Glazzard and Martine Zeuthen, “Violent extremism”. *GSDRC Professional Development Reading Pack* no. 34. University of Birmingham. (2016) [http://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Violent-extremism\\_RP.pdf](http://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Violent-extremism_RP.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> Minerva Nasser-Eddine, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostino, Gilbert Caluya. “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review” *Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, Australian Government Department of Defense* (2014). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235024824\\_Countering\\_Violent\\_Extremism\\_CVE\\_Literature\\_Review](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235024824_Countering_Violent_Extremism_CVE_Literature_Review)

<sup>15</sup> What is Violent Extremism (2017) Futures without Violence. Available at: [https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/FWV\\_blueprint\\_3-What-is-VE.pdf](https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/FWV_blueprint_3-What-is-VE.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> Christian Nünlist, Owen Frazer. “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism” *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, No.183. (2015) p.2 <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> Peter R. Neumann, “Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region.” OSCE (September 2017), p.15 <http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841?download=true>

But I am convinced that good governance is what will kill terrorism.”<sup>18</sup> That observation acknowledged that “VE does not arise in a vacuum.”<sup>19</sup> Specially at the macro-level, government actions playing an important role as drivers of VE include ‘collateral damage’ by CT<sup>20</sup> measures, human rights violations, political exclusion, socioeconomic marginalization, lack of good governance or failure to integrate diaspora communities.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, the approach of PVE<sup>22</sup> enlarges the scope of CT measures by rejecting the idea that violent extremists should be fought exclusively with intelligence, police, and military means.<sup>23</sup>

PVE builds on the question of “how can states and wider civil society create a context whereby non-violent forms of political expression are considered preferable to such violent alternatives,”<sup>24</sup> shifting the discourse away from “being reactive and negative towards more proactive measures that address root causes and promote peace, rights and pluralism in the face of violence, abuse and intolerance.”<sup>25</sup>

### ❖ Civil Society role in PVE

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This policy paper focuses on civil society because it is a key actor in the promotion of an alternative to securitized counter-terror efforts endorsed by states when addressing VE issues.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases ‘Missiles May Kill Terrorists, But I Am Convinced That Good Governance Will Kill Terrorism’, *Secretary-General Says at General Assembly Thematic Debate* SG/SM/16691-GA/11636, April 2015 <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16691.doc.htm>

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: report of the Secretary General*. A/70/674 (December 2015) available from: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/undp-ogc/documents/SG%20PVE%20plan%20of%20action.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> CT understood as militarized counter-terrorism policies focused on national security rather than human security. Focuses on preventing and combating acts of terrorism, understood only as a non-state actor form of violence. Rely heavily on military, intelligence, and security services responses.

<sup>21</sup> Christian Nünlist, Owen Frazer. “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism” *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, No.183. (2015) <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> PVE will be understood in the present policy paper as follows: Tackling conditions conducive to violent extremism, which can be state or non-state actors violence. It is one of the components of CVE when understood from a human security approach. It takes the form of interventions that focus on mitigating the root causes and an earlier intervention in the cycle of radicalization to violence. Therefore it is largely based on assumptions about what drives radicalization, which can be summarized in the following three categories:

- (1) poor governance (particularly corruption)
- (2) unresolved historical grievances (particularly those resulting in socio-economic and cultural exclusion)
- (3) human rights abuses (particularly those committed by state security actors). Especially in their responses to violent extremism and terrorism, cut across all contexts as a key driver.

Melinda Holmes “Preventing Violent Extremism through Peacebuilding: Current Perspectives from the Field” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12:2, (2017) 85-89, DOI: [10.1080/15423166.2017.1336111](https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1336111)

<sup>23</sup> Christian Nünlist, Owen Frazer. “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism” *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, No.183. (2015) <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> Daniel Kirkpatrick, “Why criminalizing non-violent extremism won’t prevent terrorism” *The Conversation*, June 13, 2017, <http://theconversation.com/why-criminalising-non-violent-extremism-wont-prevent-terrorism-78973>

<sup>25</sup> Melinda Holmes, “Preventing Violent Extremism, Protecting Rights and Community Policing. Why Civil Society and Security Sector Partnerships Matter”. *ICAN*. (2017): p.19 <http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PVE-and-Policing-Brief-2017.pdf>

Civil society<sup>26</sup> role in CVE/PVE efforts was acknowledged by the international community in the UN resolution 2178 (2014).<sup>27</sup> Indeed, the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism<sup>28</sup> adopted a comprehensive approach which went further from security-based counter-terrorism measures, stressing that National PVE Plans should count with non-governmental actors inputs, including those of civil society organizations.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are “uniquely placed to bridge gaps between global policy and local realities, as they count with local knowledge, the trust of local actors, and an understanding of root causes of conflict that drive extremism.”<sup>29</sup> CSOs “can ensure that programs are relevant and authentic to the context while advising security actors, facilitating interactions between them and communities and monitoring interventions to prevent and limit abuse.”<sup>30</sup> In fact, “experience demonstrates that internationally and nationally driven strategies are rarely effective if they exclude communities and organizations that have a track record [...] in preventing violence.”<sup>31</sup>

CSOs commitment to the advancement of human rights contributes to “dry the wells of extremism from which violence springs”<sup>32</sup> since they address political grievances and socio-economic injustices. “This work is not labeled counterterrorism, nor should it be, but it is exactly what is needed to counter violent extremism.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> “The concept of civil society describes the capacity of a community to organize itself without the direction or intervention of the state.” Craig Calhoun, “Civil Society and the Public Sphere.” *The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society*: 311-24. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195398571.003.0025. Cited by Erich J. Sommerfeldt & Michael L. Kent (2015) Civil Society, Networks, and Relationship Management: Beyond the Organization–Public Dyad, *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 9:3, 235-252, DOI: 10.1080/1553118X.2015.1025405

<sup>27</sup> UNSC encouraged Member States to engage with non-governmental actors and local communities when developing CVE strategies. United Nations Security Council resolution 2178, *The rule of law at the national and international levels*, S/RES/2178 (24 September 2014) available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2178>

<sup>28</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: report of the Secretary General*. A/70/674 (December 2015) available from: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/undp-ogc/documents/SG%20PVE%20plan%20of%20action.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Kristen Wall, “Addressing Violent Extremism: Creating Spaces for Civil Society Engagement” *Human Security Network*, (June 2012): p.2 <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.net/documents/125374024/0>

<sup>30</sup> Melinda Holmes, “Preventing Violent Extremism, Protecting Rights and Community Policing: Why Civil Society and Security Sector Partnerships Matter” WASL, ICAN (2017): p.8 <http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PVE-and-Policing-Brief-2017.pdf>

<sup>31</sup> Melinda Holmes, Sanam N. Anderlini and Rosalie Fransen, “Uncomfortable Truths, Unconventional Wisdoms” WASL, ICAN (2016): p.8. <http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/WASL-Security-Brief-Exec-Summary-2016.pdf>

<sup>32</sup> David Cortright, Alistair Millar, Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf and George A. Lopez "Friend, Not Foe: The Role of Civil Society in Preventing Violent Extremism," *Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law*: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 3 (2012): p.255. <http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl/vol2/iss2/3>


<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

### III.Contextualization: VE in Jordan and Actors Addressing It

Departing from the understanding of VE as a broad concept encompassing VE in all its forms and acknowledging that it can be committed by both state and non-state actors,<sup>34</sup> the following contextualization identifies the main expressions that VE takes in Jordan as well as the most relevant actors in C/PVE efforts.

#### ❖ Country Overview

Figure 1.1: Jordan Map and Country Profile <sup>35</sup>



Jordan was born in 1946 with its independence from Britain and was ruled by King Hussein until 1999, when King Abdullah II took power. Though officially defined as a constitutional monarchy,<sup>36</sup> executive and legislative authority lies in the King,<sup>37</sup> who as expressed in the Constitution (Art.30), “is the head of state and is immune from any liability and

<sup>34</sup> See Theoretical Framework: Violent Extremism and its Prevention, p. 4

<sup>35</sup> Map and Country data from: “Jordan - Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Country Profile” One world Nations online, Nations Online Project, accessed 12 Mar. 2018. <http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/jordan.htm>

<sup>36</sup> “Political System & Government.” Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Athens, accessed March 12, 2018. [http://jordanembassy.gr/?page\\_id=19](http://jordanembassy.gr/?page_id=19).

<sup>37</sup> United States Department of State. (2018). “Jordan Executive Summary Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor.” United States Department of State, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186643.pdf>



responsibility.”<sup>38</sup> Thus, no separation of powers exists since the King appoints the Prime Minister, the members of the upper house of Parliament, and the judges.

Jordan is a “labor-rich and capital poor country”<sup>39</sup> that can be defined as a “non-oil rentier economy” since it relies upon external income sources, mainly foreign aid and worker remittances.

Despite King’s promises of political openness<sup>40</sup> after the Arab Springs, regional instability hampered reforms,<sup>41</sup> and democratization was sacrificed for national security. Indeed, under the strengthened security apparatus<sup>42</sup> and specially the 2014 Anti-Terror Law, “few feel safe enough to speak honestly about these issues in public, given that security forces have ensnared hundreds of journalists, bloggers, and students with no connection to religious extremism for the simple reason that their criticisms and ideas disturbed public order.”<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> “Governance of Jordan” Fanack, last modified October 24, 2017 <https://fanack.com/jordan/governance/>

<sup>39</sup> Anne Marie Baylouny “Militarizing welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy” *Middle East Journal*, 62(2), 277–303 (2008):p.284. <http://doi.org/10.3751/62.2.15>

<sup>40</sup> Sean L. Yom, and Wael Al-Khatib. "Jordan's New Politics of Tribal Dissent." *Foreign Policy*. August 07, 2012. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/07/jordans-new-politics-of-tribal-dissent/>.

<sup>41</sup> Regional instability defined by Saudi-Iranian strive for regional geopolitical domination, and in specific the War in Syria and its spill-over effects, have secured regime support among international powers and Jordanian people, who praise their living conditions when compared to the ones of their neighbours.


<sup>42</sup> Sean L. Yom, and Wael Al-Khatib. "Inflating the Salafi Threat in Jordan." *Atlantic Council*. December 05, 2014. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/inflating-the-salafi-threat-in-jordan>.

<sup>43</sup> “The Crime of Speech: How Arab Governments Use the Law to Silence Expression Online” Electronic Frontier Foundation, accessed 12 Mar. 2018, <https://www.eff.org/pages/crime-speech-how-arab-governments-use-law-silence-expression-online>

## ❖ Types of VE identified in Jordan

VE in Jordan has been found to take different forms here identified as State Violence, Societal Violence, Jihadi-Salafist Violence and Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV).<sup>44</sup> Note that the present classification accounts for the diverse forms in which direct violence manifests. However, it must be acknowledged that this visible and direct forms of violence are all built on deep structural and cultural violence.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, though compartmented for practical reasons, these types of VE are deeply interconnected with each other. The Diagram presented in Annex 1 develops further on these interrelations.<sup>46</sup>

*Figure 1.2: Violent Extremism types present in Jordan, distinguishing visible (direct) and invisible (structural and cultural) forms of violence according to J. Galtung terms. Source: Own elaboration.*



### *State Violence*

Direct state violence takes the form of security forces violence, torture and death penalty. Regarding security forces violence, it stands out the incidents of violence by security forces

<sup>44</sup> SGBV has been mapped as type of extremist violence present in Jordan, specifically in the form of honor killings, domestic violence against women, and violence against the LGBTBIQ community. This violence has to be understood as the visible part of broader and deeper pressures of structural and cultural violence generated by the heteropatriarchy. Given the inherent complexity and sensitivity of the issue, it has not been the aim of this policy paper to further develop on it. UN Women, 2012. [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/vaw/VAW\\_Jordan\\_baseline\\_assessment\\_final.pdf](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/vaw/VAW_Jordan_baseline_assessment_final.pdf)

<sup>45</sup> This contextualization will observe the main kinds of violent extremism taking place in Jordan, being understood as the use of violence in the pursuit of political goals, what would be direct violence in J. Galtung's terms. However, this direct violence does not take place in a vacuum. Direct violence is in many occasions the visible manifestation or symptom of deeper kinds of violence, such as structural or cultural violence. Structural violence is the one that refers to social injustices, and takes the form of repression and exploitation and is embedded in political, social or economic structures. In another vein, cultural violence refers to "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology- [...] that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence." Galtung, J., Violence, War, and Their Impact: On Visible and Invisible Effects of Violence, in Polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 5, 2004, pp.6, <http://them.polylog.org/5/fgj-en.htm>

Galtung, J., Cultural Violence, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3. (Aug., 1990), pp. 291-305. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433%28199008%2927%3A3%3C291%3ACV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>

<sup>46</sup> Please, see Annex 1: Violent Extremisms Interconnections in Jordan Diagram.

against 2011 peaceful demonstrators<sup>47</sup> as well as the “ongoing human rights violations by security forces during arrest,”<sup>48</sup> which include denied access to a lawyer and torture.<sup>49</sup>

Concerning torture, there is an insufficient legislative environment to prosecute and punish perpetrators because torture is criminalized in a fragmentary manner. The abuse of power resulting from the limitation of the law’s definition of torture,<sup>50</sup> has been pointed as a driver for embracing VE ideologies and behaviors.<sup>51</sup>

Respecting death penalty,<sup>52</sup> it is imposed under the authority of the 1960 Penal Code and the 2014 Anti-Terror Law.<sup>53</sup>

## ***Societal Violence***

Societal Violence in Jordan takes the form of direct clashes to be understood upon deep social divisions, mainly along tribal lines, between Transjordanians<sup>54</sup> and Jordanian-Palestinians<sup>55</sup>, and between refugees and locals.

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<sup>47</sup> United States Department of State. “Jordan Executive Summary Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor.” United States Department of State, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186643.pdf>

<sup>48</sup> Amnesty International. “Jordan 2017/2018.” <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/jordan/report-jordan/>

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> The Jordanian Penal Code No.16 of 1960 limits the definition of torture to extracting confession or acquiring information. Specially Article 208, does not consider torture a serious crime but rather “including it within the range of the misdemeanors, unless the crime led to death or injury”. The Jordan National Center for Human Rights. “The Jordan National Center for Human Rights Report.” *JNCHR* (2012): p. 4 [http://www.nchr.org.jo/Admin\\_Site/Files/PDF/2143fb8f-6eab-450d-bbd6-07872e58878f.pdf](http://www.nchr.org.jo/Admin_Site/Files/PDF/2143fb8f-6eab-450d-bbd6-07872e58878f.pdf) This violates the provisions of the UN Convention Against Torture that stipulates conferring the criminal character on the acts of torture as being viewed one of the most grave crimes. *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, New York, 10 December 1984, available from <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx>

<sup>51</sup> Anne Speckhard “The Jihad in Jordan: Drivers of Radicalization into Violent Extremism in Jordan.” Academia, 2018. [https://www.academia.edu/32337905/The\\_Jihad\\_in\\_Jordan\\_Drivers\\_of\\_Radicalization\\_into\\_Violent\\_Extremism\\_in\\_Jordan](https://www.academia.edu/32337905/The_Jihad_in_Jordan_Drivers_of_Radicalization_into_Violent_Extremism_in_Jordan)

<sup>52</sup> Death penalty has been identified as a form of State Violence since it breaches two essential human rights expressed in the UNDHR which are the right to life and the right to live free from torture. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) United Nations. Available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217\(III\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217(III))

<sup>53</sup> Human Rights Watch. “Jordan: Terrorism Amendments Threaten Rights.” HRW, May 17, 2014. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/17/jordan-terrorism-amendments-threaten-rights>

<sup>54</sup> Transjordanians or East Bankers are those Jordanians original from the East Bank, they trace their heritage from tribal confederations that resided in the area before the arrival of Palestinian refugees-cum-citizens starting with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour “Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalization in Jordan: Social and Political Dimensions” CTC Sentinel, Volume 10, Issue 4 pp. 29-30 (April 2017):p.28, [https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel\\_Vol10Iss44.pdf](https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss44.pdf)

<sup>55</sup> Following 1949 Declaration of the state of Israel and the Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian refugees settled in Jordan, which extended its sovereignty and rule to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The majority of Palestinians already had Jordanian citizenship upon the “unification of the two Banks”. Jordanian society became a mixture of two both East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians. The granting of these rights helped Palestinians improve their status and contribute to Jordan’s development. Sawzan Ramahi. “Palestinians & Jordanian citizenship” Middle East Monitor Special Report, (2015):p.5 [https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/reports/20151209\\_Palestinians-and-Jordanian-citizenship.pdf](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/reports/20151209_Palestinians-and-Jordanian-citizenship.pdf)

Some government policies, hereby identified as structural violence, have fostered these divisions. Among these, are found neoliberal policies,<sup>56</sup> which ended the social contract that exchanged economic security for political backing, and the regime's traditional support was replaced by a strengthened military built from some Transjordanian sub-groups.<sup>57</sup>

Prior to reforms in 1989, the policy of Jordanisation<sup>58</sup> favored access to the state social welfare to Transjordanians, excluding Jordanian-Palestinians. This coincided with demographic and labor market divisions.<sup>59</sup> With neoliberal policies, Transjordanians lost their privileged positions and were left vulnerable and dependent on the state.<sup>60</sup>

**Tribal violence** has to be understood in the “absence of any robust sense of national identity” and the “the multiplicity of competing subnational identities that more often exclude than include,”<sup>61</sup> with tribalism<sup>62</sup> being the main source of identity. The state granting of preferential access to government resources to certain tribes<sup>63</sup> has accentuated such divisions. Therefore, incidents between individuals spreading into their respective tribes and generating

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<sup>56</sup> Fostered by Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs) in the 1990s

<sup>57</sup> The military and security services, made up by a sub-group of East-Bankers, were the only sector growing during structural adjustments. While social welfare allocations decreased in general, the military's budgets, pensions and social security expenditures increased, with scholarships reserved for the military and their dependents, along with free medical care. Militarizing welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy. Anne Marie Baylouny “Militarizing welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy” *Middle East Journal*, 62(2), 277–303 (2008):p. 302 doi:<http://doi.org/10.3751/62.2.15>

<sup>58</sup> The policy of Jordanisation (Ardana), which already existed in the 1970's restricts employment in the military and security forces to Transjordanians. This discrimination extends to the political, economic, and public education and health sectors, especially in high positions, except for some cases in the education and health sectors and some high political positions. This has inevitably left the private sector to the Palestinians, above all the economic sector. Lamis El Muhtaseb “Jordan's East Banker-Palestinian schism” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. (April 2013) <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162779/746892aacedd3e8fcb1ff7370a77fb67.pdf>

<sup>59</sup> “A dichotomy of employment opportunities characterize the rural and urban regions of the country”. While Transjordanians inhabit the rural northern and southern regions and work in the army and state employment; Jordanian-Palestinians live in the central, urbanized area, where industry and private sector concentrates. Militarizing welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy. Anne Marie Baylouny “Militarizing welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy” *Middle East Journal*, 62(2), 277–303 (2008):p.282, doi:<http://doi.org/10.3751/62.2.15>

<sup>60</sup> Jordanian-Palestinians, employed in the private sector and benefiting from remittances from the Gulf, developed extensive networks of reciprocity and distribution to cope with inflation in the 90's. By contrast, the rural, mainly Transjordanian areas, dependent upon state employment were particularly vulnerable as structural adjustment proceeded. Liberalization exposed the previously beneficiary population to international price fluctuations and government aid was directed mainly to urban areas. Militarizing welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy. Anne Marie Baylouny “Militarizing welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian policy” *Middle East Journal*, 62(2), 277–303 (2008):p.303, doi: <http://doi.org/10.3751/62.2.15>

<sup>61</sup> Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour “Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalization in Jordan: Social and Political Dimensions” CTC Sentinel, Volume 10, Issue 4 pp.29-30 (April 2017):p.28, [https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel\\_Vol10Iss44.pdf](https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss44.pdf)

<sup>62</sup> Pre-state Jordan was organized tribally, with tribes being the most important units of governance and social division, fitting the nomadic way of life. With the formation of the state, nomadic lifestyle was abandoned but tribal social structure remained, still shaping today, divisions and rules along tribal lines. The monarchy acknowledges their role as King Hussein publicly stated that “law will remain closely connected to norms, customs, and traditions”. Hayley Mohan, “Jordanian Tribal Violence: Historical Context and Current Problems.” *Center for Strategic Studies University of Jordan* (2010), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/139093/107.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> Northern and central tribes like the Bani Sakhr and the Sirhan, enjoy a preferential access to public employment and government resources than poorer southern tribes like the Bani Hamida and the Huwaytat. Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour “Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalization in Jordan: Social and Political Dimensions” CTC Sentinel, Volume 10, Issue 4 pp.29-30 (April 2017):p.28, [https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel\\_Vol10Iss44.pdf](https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss44.pdf)

violence spirals are not unusual in Jordan, where tribal laws of administering justice often clash with state's use of force.<sup>64</sup>

Regarding **Violence between Transjordanians and Jordanian-Palestinians**, grievances from Jordanian-Palestinians come from their systematic discrimination regarding freedom of movement,<sup>65</sup> specially for Gazans;<sup>66</sup> political participation,<sup>67</sup> access to state employment, and access to social welfare.<sup>68</sup> Grievances from Transjordanians relate with Jordanian-Palestinians economic status derived from their predominance in the private sector, the fear of Jordan being made the Palestinian's "alternative homeland", and little involvement of Jordanian-Palestinians in the Arab Spring.<sup>69</sup> The schism is not clear-cut as applies only to Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship and the Jordanisation policy has discriminated between tribes as well.

**Violence between refugees and locals**, comes upon the influx of Syrian refugees,<sup>70</sup> which created conflict over the increase in rents, the competition for "income-generating activities" and resources, and the overcrowding of public services,<sup>71</sup> hampering social cohesion.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Kristen Kao "Do Jordan's tribes challenge or strengthen the state?", *Washington Post*, May 28, 2015, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/28/do-jordans-tribes-challenge-or-strengthen-the-state/?utm\\_term=.1108b1a1498a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/28/do-jordans-tribes-challenge-or-strengthen-the-state/?utm_term=.1108b1a1498a)

<sup>65</sup> Freedom of movement restrictions include the arbitrarily and unlawful withdrawal of citizenship and the existence of stateless persons derived from the fact that only male citizens can transmit citizenship to their children, affecting all those families in which the father has Palestinian origin. United States Department of State. (2018). "Jordan Executive Summary Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor." United States Department of State, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186643.pdf>

<sup>66</sup> Palestinian refugees from Gaza who flew in 1967 to Jordan and who amount up to 140,000, "face a number of legal impediments that deprive them of their basic rights", with no access to neither the public nor the private sector, no citizenship rights to state education, own property or health insurance. Sawzan Ramahi. "Palestinians & Jordanian citizenship" Middle East Monitor Special Report, (2015):p.7 [https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/reports/20151209\\_Palestinians-and-Jordanian-citizenship.pdf](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/reports/20151209_Palestinians-and-Jordanian-citizenship.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> When it comes to political participation, gerrymandering districts and the electoral law favor tribal interests over Palestinians. The electoral law system favors southern provinces of East Bankers allowing Bedouins to send more representatives to parliament. Nur Köprülü "Consolidated monarchies in the post-'Arab Spring' era: the case of Jordan" *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 20, No.3, 318-327 (2014):p.320 doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2014.922803>

<sup>68</sup> Refer to the *In-depth* box, p. 12

<sup>69</sup> The failure to unite with East Bankers on the protests can be attributed to the fear to be made "guests" or to an unknown scenario in which the Monarchy comes to an end. Lamis El Muhtaseb "Jordan's East Banker-Palestinian schism" Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. (April 2013) <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162779/746892aacedd3e8fcb1ff7370a77fb67.pdf>

<sup>70</sup> Jordan has become host of some 1.266 million Syrians, of which 655,833 are officially registered as refugees, meaning that Jordan has the second-greatest ratio of refugees to citizens of any country in the world (only after Lebanon). Luigi Achilli, Nasser Yassin and M. Murat Erdoğan, *Neighbouring Host-Countries' Policies for Syrian Refugees: the Cases of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey*. (Barcelona, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2017), p.13.

<sup>71</sup> UNHCR. "Operational Portal Refugee Situations." UNHCR, 2018. <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations?page=1&view=grid&Language%25255B%25255D=1&Country%25255B%25255D=107&Type%25255B%25255D=3>

<sup>72</sup> Jordanian communities regard refugees as responsible for living conditions deterioration while refugee communities perceive a lack of security for their children. "Understanding Social Cohesion & Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities." REACH Assessment Report, British Embassy Amman (June 2014):p.2, [http://www.reach-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/REACH\\_Social-Cohesion-Resilience-in-Jordanian-Host-Communities\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.reach-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/REACH_Social-Cohesion-Resilience-in-Jordanian-Host-Communities_FINAL.pdf); Maira Seeley, "Jordanian Hosts and Syrian Refugees: Comparing Perceptions of Social Conflict and Cohesion in Three Host Communities." Generations for peace, (May-December 2015):p.23 <http://www.generationsforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/OX-2015-MS-Report-02.pdf>


Nevertheless, structural vulnerabilities such as poverty or unemployment are prior to the Syrian crisis. Cohesion was already under pressure due to a fragile Jordanian identity and traditional social connections under the strain of neoliberal policies.

### ***Violence by Jihadi-Salafist groups<sup>73</sup>***

Violence by Jihadi-Salafists groups, mainly the Islamic State and AlQaeda, has been the main concern when dealing with VE in Jordan, being the main (or only) target of international and state interventions since it is the most visible form of VE.

Jordan is ranked among the top ten providers of foreign fighters to the Syrian conflict,<sup>74</sup> with the highest ratio of foreign fighters per capita.<sup>75</sup> Some global Salafi-jihadi leaders such as al Zarqawi, al-Maqsidi or Abu Qatada al Filastini, have Jordanian origins.<sup>76</sup>

*Figure 1.3. Jihadi-Salafist attacks in Jordanian soil since 2005. Source: Own elaboration.*



<sup>73</sup> Note that salafism is an ideological movement that advocates for the establishment of a universal Islamic order to recover the essence of Islam and confront its corruption. But unlike Jihadi-Salafism, salafism does not defend the use of armed struggle to achieve that goal. Therefore, Jihadi-Salafism is used to denominate the branch within salafism that supports the use of violence. While using this terminology, it is important to note that "Jihad" means a doctrinal obligation on the Muslim to strive to establish on Earth the word of God, that is, Islam, but it is not related to violence. It is, on the one hand, the spiritual effort of the Muslim to improve himself/herself (known as 'major Jihad'), and on the other, the effort to improve what surrounds him/her ('minor Jihad'). Jihadi-Salafist denominate themselves as jihadi. Luz Gómez, *Glosario del Islam*. Observatorio de la islamofobia en los medios, accessed February 06, 2018. <http://www.observatorioislamofobia.org/glosario>

<sup>74</sup> Fares Braizat; Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci and Amer Sabaileh "Determining Youth Radicalization in Jordan." ICSVE, (2018). <http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/determining-youth-radicalization-in-jordan/>

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.


<sup>76</sup> Joas Wagemakers, "Jihadi-Salafism in Jordan and the Syrian Conflict: Divisions Overcome Unity." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 41, no. 3 (2017): 191-212. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2017.1283197



## ❖ Mapping of Actors

In the following section, a descriptive identification of the most relevant stakeholders working on P/CVE efforts in Jordan is provided. The mapping takes into account both state and non-state actors, including the civil society and the international community, thus offering a comprehensive picture of the actors with which the OPEV deals with.

*Figure 1.4: Diagram of the identified actors classified by type. Despite presented separately, there is a relation of interdependence among the State, civil society and the international community. Source: Own elaboration.*



### ***Jordanian State***

The Jordanian State is one of the most relevant actors to take into account in C/PVE efforts. Among the actors mapped, it is the one with the higher power of influence, having the capacity to impact on the ability of other actors to conduct their PVE activities. This is specially a concern for the civil society, who perceive their work as to be dependent on state's approval.<sup>77</sup> Different institutions within state structures play a diversity of roles presented as follows.

<sup>77</sup> Extracted from the analysis of the questionnaires conducted among key civil society actors in Jordan. See the civil society actors consulted list in Annex 3: Analysis of questionnaires' results

Table 1.1. Mapping of Actors: Jordanian State

ACTOR	ACTION
<b>JORDANIAN STATE</b>	
Military	Global Coalition against Daesh
General Intelligence Directorate (GID), police and Special Forces	Detection of militant activities, swift dismantling of discovered cells, and prevention of border penetration by Islamic State operatives from Syria
Legal Apparatus	2014 Anti-Terror Law
Monarchy	2004 Amman Message
	International “Aqaba meetings” for the “fights against terror” in January 2016
	Prince Rashid Office, Special Forces Command
Private Security Companies	Border Security Program
Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments)	Regulation of religious discourse
Dar al-Ifta (Department for Issuing Fatwas) headed by the Grand Mufti of Jordan	
Ministry of Interior’s Directorate of Combating Extremism and Violence	National Program for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (Now also in hands of Prince Rashid Special Forces office)
Public Security Directorate’s Community Peace Center	Preventive radicalization program with local communities and civil society and a prison-based de-radicalization program
The following ministries also play a role in PVE efforts: Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MOPPA), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Youth, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. (Specially as they are partners of Un-led projects on the issue).	

## Civil Society <sup>78</sup>

While the P/CVE literature highlights the key role played by local civil society organizations for the adaptation of P/CVE interventions to the local context, the reach and strength of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in Jordan is generally understood to be poor.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, there are “power disparities between stakeholders working on human security programming in Jordan, whereby UN bodies and INGOs enjoy strong leverage compared to

<sup>78</sup> See *Annex 2: Mapping of Actors (Extended Version)* for a complete list of civil society organizations working in PVE in Jordan.

<sup>79</sup> “Snapshot of Civil Society in Jordan.” Civicus, 2015. [http://www.civicus.org/images/Snapshot\\_of\\_CS\\_in\\_Jordan.pdf](http://www.civicus.org/images/Snapshot_of_CS_in_Jordan.pdf).

local CBOs.”<sup>80</sup> It is also to stress, that civil society organizations regard laws such as the 2014 Anti-Terror Law and the lack of support by the authorities to civil society initiatives on PVE as a challenge to operate. Civil society actors are therefore highly conditioned by the state.

The present mapping has identified a wide range of civil society actors working on P/CVE in Jordan, including both local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs and INGOs, respectively). Civil society actors have been classified between those directly linked with the Jordanian state,<sup>81</sup> and those which are not.

### **Observatory for the Prevention of Extremist Violence (OPEV)<sup>82</sup>**

The OPEV is a platform of civil society organizations from across the Euro-Mediterranean Region which work on PVE from a constructive perspective. The platform coordinates efforts to follow-up the implementation of the Plan of Action of the Euro-Mediterranean civil society to prevent all forms of violent extremism that resulted from the Barcelona Conference in January 2017. Currently, there are formally set observatories in Barcelona, Jordan and Tunisia, and there is one in the making in Iraq. The Euro-Mediterranean network is coordinated by OPEV Barcelona and led by NOVACT. In Jordan, the OPEV is composed of six members: Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD); Durrat Al Manal; Leaders of Tomorrow; Jordanian National Commission for Women; Penal Reform International; and East and West Center for Development.

OPEV’s strengths, weaknesses and threats will be identified and considered in the PESL and SWOT analysis to then provide with several recommendations to improve its shortcomings and take advantage of its opportunities.

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<sup>80</sup> Nadine Sayegh and Neven Bondokji “Towards a unified human security and P/CVE method in Jordan: Challenges and Changes.” WANA Institute, (October 2017):p.17, [http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publication\\_TowardsAUnifiedHumanSecurityAndPCVEMethodInJordan\\_English\\_0.pdf](http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publication_TowardsAUnifiedHumanSecurityAndPCVEMethodInJordan_English_0.pdf)

<sup>81</sup> Civil society actors linked to the state are created by a royal decree and presided by royal authorities, being this a very common phenomena in Jordan.

<sup>82</sup> Find further information about the member organizations in Annex 2: Mapping of Actors (Extended Version).

Table 1.2. OPEV-member organizations

OPEV	
OPEV Jordan members	Area of impact
ARDD - Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development	Human rights Social justice Youth empowerment Participatory research on PVE
Durrat al Manal for Development and Training	Empowerment of minors in detention centers
Jordan National Commission for Women	PVE from a gender perspective
Leaders of Tomorrow	Public Debates Freedom of expression Youth empowerment
NOVACT Institute for Non-Violent Action	Civil society empowerment throughout non-violent action PVE research
Penal Reform International	PVE in prisons
West and East Center for Development	International, regional and national public debates Social activists empowerment Debates in universities

### *International Community* <sup>83</sup>

The UN has attempted to play a key role by partnering with the Jordanian State to create a National Strategy on C/PVE in Jordan. In fact, Jordan's minister of Interior signed in 2016 a joint partnership with UNDP in Jordan to support P/CVE through the development of the National Strategy.<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, these efforts have not materialized in a National Plan that offers guidance for both government and non-government institutions working on P/CVE, as it has not been in the interest of the state to open this sensitive issue to debate. UNESCO and UN Women are also running some activities on PVE in the country. The EU has been active in CVE as well through the EU-Jordan Compact and in PVE through the Instrument for Peace and Stability.

<sup>83</sup> For further details, see Annex 2: Mapping of Actors (Extended Version)

<sup>84</sup> UNDP. *National Strategy on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan* (May 17, 2016) Available from <http://www.jo.undp.org/content/jordan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/05/17/national-strategy-on-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-in-jordan-p-cve-.html>

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## IV. Problem Identification, Assessing OPEV's Potential

All consulted civil society organizations agree on the fact that civil society is well suited to address a wide range of manifestations taken by VE<sup>85</sup> and regards coalitions of civil society organizations to be a useful tool to overcome civil society challenges in Jordan.<sup>86</sup> All consulted OPEV members value the network as fundamental in PVE efforts in Jordan.<sup>87</sup> However, the expectations have not been met by the network's performance.<sup>88</sup> According to its members, the goal on which the network has been more able to deliver outcomes has been in gaining leverage to advocate for OPEV's values and vision regarding VE.<sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, it has only been achieved to a low extent.

The research carried out through the theoretical framework and the contextualization point at OPEV network as a civil society initiative with potential to make an important contribution in PVE in Jordan. However, general constraints for civil society generated by the political environment in the country, added to a series of internal weaknesses such as the lack of a strategy, reduce the network's ability to deliver on its goals. To serve the aim of this Policy Paper in providing OPEV with recommendations to strengthen the network, a thorough assessment of both OPEV's environment and internal dynamics has been carried out and expressed in the form of a PESL and SWOT analysis.

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<sup>85</sup> See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

## ❖ PESL Analysis

According to consulted civil society organizations, one of the main challenges for civil society to work on PVE in Jordan arise from the political environment. Specifically, the recent restrictions on civil society posed by laws such as the 2014 AntiTerror Law and the lack of support by authorities to civil society initiatives when it comes to PVE are pointed at as main challenges.<sup>90</sup> Interestingly, OPEV members note the use of the term of VE as a source of challenges in itself.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, having a closer look at external conditions is essential in order to assess the network's functioning and its role. The following PESL Analysis (Table 2.1) identifies the main external factors to consider (classified as political, economic, social and legal), the potential effects of these external conditions on OPEV's work, and how these effects can be a threat for the network. These identified threats are further developed in the SWOT Analysis.

Table 2.1. PESL Analysis

	External factors to consider	Effects	Threats
POLITICAL	Regional instability	Promotion of a securitized response to VE, based on counterterror efforts	PVE being instrumentalized as an euphemism for counter-terror efforts
	No separation of powers	PVE competences in a blurred area between the government and the Royal House	Lack of a public official PVE plan, which leaves unclear the role of civil society  PVE at the hands of Prince Rahid office, linking it to securitized counter-terror efforts
	Restrained political and civil rights and freedoms	Civil society role is constrained	Risk of being co-opted by the state
LEGAL	Ministry of Public Affairs control over IGOs and NGOs' projects' acceptance		Risk of being marginalized due to state discontent

<sup>90</sup> See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*



	2014 AntiTerror Law	Offending state reputation becomes a legal offence.	Being criminalized by this law
		Further restriction of political and civil rights and freedoms	Legal impediments to perform OPEV's activities
ECONOMIC	PVE as a topic that attracts funding from international donors	Many organizations compete for resources	Lack of funding for OPEV activities
	Income depending on international donors	Many of the projects are short-term oriented	Lack of long-term vision and strategy in project design, a must when working on prevention
SOCIAL	Civil society and CBOs in Jordan are generally understood to be weak	Some organizations lack capabilities and structures to perform some activities	Inability to gain more space in decision-making in a restrictive environment
	PVE is a very sensitive topic in many senses, as it tackles issues such as identity or religion	Necessity to be very cautious on the use of terms and the avoidance of stigmatization of certain communities	Being rejected by local communities due to misunderstanding of OPEV's vision on VE (as if VE with religious connotations was its main target)  Being rejected due to OPEV's broad vision on VE (SGBV, state violence, etc)

## ❖ SWOT Analysis

The following SWOT analysis points at the main strengths and opportunities that conform OPEV's potential, as well as the weaknesses and threats that are hampering its development. The analysis has been constructed on the basis of the already presented theoretical framework and contextualization, and complemented by the insights obtained from consulted civil society organizations and OPEV members through the questionnaires and periodic consultations with NOVACT staff.

The SWOT reveals that OPEV has an added value as a PVE actor in the Jordanian context, but there are several internal aspects on which there is room for improvement, specially regarding internal dynamics, strategic vision, network's capacity and communication. When it comes to external aspects, it can be observed that the main threats come all from the delicate political environment, which restraints the action of civil society actors specially when it comes to PVE as previously assessed in the PESL.

*Table 2.2. SWOT Analysis*

POSITIVE ASPECTS	NEGATIVE ASPECTS
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
Comprehensive view on the concept of VE, recognizing that VE can take multiple forms. It acknowledges that VE acts are not exclusive of non-state actors. (1)	Generally, members share the same vision on which types of violence constitute VE, but still there are disagreements regarding some specific forms, such as SGBV. (5)
By working together, the organizations have more power in advocating for the paradigm of PVE they are committed to.	OPEV lacks an advocacy strategy that allows it to advocate for its alternative view on how to prevent VE. (6)
OPEV counts with an alternative framework on how to conduct PVE from a broader approach that addresses the shortcomings of institutionalized power. All members regard themselves as organizations addressing the drivers and roots causes that may lead to the irruption of VE, from a political, social and economic perspective. (2)	
PVE programs set up and implemented in cooperation with CSOs are more credible since CSOs have local roots, are citizen-oriented and led and are committed to enhance social cohesion and respect for HR. (3)	

**Member's nature, mission and values**

		POSITIVE ASPECTS	NEGATIVE ASPECTS	
Internal Aspects		OPEV is a network made up of civil society organizations, locally-based, and able to generate bottom-up social transformation. It includes a diverse organizations (linked to the state, non-linked, international and local) that enrich the network and its outcomes.	Power disparities between stakeholders working on human security in Jordan. UN bodies and INGOs enjoy strong leverage compared to local CBOs. (7)	
		Civil society is “uniquely placed to bridge gaps between global policy and local realities, local knowledge, the trust of local actors, and an understanding of root causes of conflict that drive extremism.” (4)	The reach and strength of CBOs in Jordan is generally poor. (8)	
		Being member of the network is part of the organizations’ strategy to a medium extent. (9)	Lack of a Strategic Plan for OPEV Jordan though members regard that its creation would be valuable. (10)	Strategy
		All members are willing to participate in OPEV decision-making processes. (11)	Unawareness by the members about what are the decision-making processes. (13)	Decision-making
		All members consider that there are effective channels to participate in decision-making, which is considered horizontal and democratic. (12)	Lack of multilateral decision-making that includes all OPEV members. (14)	
		A network like OPEV that brings together NGOs of different sizes and budgets can create good synergies among its members. Bigger NGOs can contribute in capacity-building for smaller NGOs, while small NGOs (which usually have a very important community base) can contribute to effective implementation by providing ownership and a social base to bigger NGOs’ programs.	Some of the members lack an institutional structure. (15)	Capacity
			Lack of funding (16)	
			Imbalance among the members in terms of resources (including time), what can create a diversity in terms of needs, goals and capacities. (17)	
			Mal-functioning internal communication. Member organizations consider that the network has been able to contribute to the exchange of information, knowledge, expertise, lessons learned and good practices only to a medium-low extent. Most of consulted OPEV members do not know what other member organizations are doing in relation to PVE. It is also telling that one of the consulted member organizations did not know whether OPEV Jordan had a Strategy or Action Plan. (18)	Internal Communication

POSITIVE ASPECTS	NEGATIVE ASPECTS	
One of the member organizations, the Jordanian National Commission for Women, is part of the state structure but has been able to act with certain autonomy. This provides OPEV with a connection to the Jordanian State, and therefore certain (even if weak) protection.	OPEV External Communication practices are rated as poor by its members. 50% of non-OPEV consulted organizations did not know the OPEV. Moreover, those who did, do not consider it a relevant actor in PVE. Most of OPEV members acknowledge this problem in terms of visibility as they think that other stakeholders working on PVE in Jordan do not know the network (20).	External Communication and Visibility
The biggest organizations of the network, such as ARDD-Legal Aid and the Jordanian National Commission for Women, find advantages in working together and provide the network with more visibility, and those which are smaller benefit from being under the network umbrella. Most of the consulted civil society organizations knew OPEV member organizations, some of them recognized for their PVE work as relevant stakeholders. (19)	Poor visibility. Lacking of basic technical instruments of visibility creation such as a common website or a Facebook page.	
Leadership has been assessed positively by members. The leaders have a strong relation with all other organizations, what makes them suited for leadership tasks. (21)	There is room for improvement regarding the leaders' ability to convene and facilitate productive interactions between the members. (26)	
In a delicate political environment, OPEV members trust each other and there exists an environment of confidence. (22)	Not all OPEV members consider cooperation to prevail over competition in inter-organizational relations among the members of the network. (27)	L E A D E R S H I P
All members consider the network as a useful tool to avoid overlapping. (23)	Not well established group relations. Bilateral relations among some members are much stronger. Some organizations have no relations at all with some of the other network members. (28)	
OPEV functioning as a network among different NGOs is the only proposal of this kind in the field of PVE in Jordan. It is usual for NGOs to build up partnerships for specific projects, but OPEV has the potential to make a step further and englobe organizations for a longer time horizon than a specific project implementation. Therefore, it is suited to pursuit longer-term goals. All consulted civil society organizations regard coalitions of CSOs to be a useful tool to overcome civil society challenges in Jordan. (24)	Members' expectations regarding what the network must provide with have not been met by outcomes. (29)	
All consulted members regard themselves as contributing to a medium-high extent to OPEV, mainly through building relationships with community groups and general public, providing accommodation for project activities, network meetings, workshops, etc. and generating visibility and reputation. (25)	According to members' self-perception, there is an unequal degree of involvement in the network by the different organizations. Most of consulted organizations regard the lack of commitment by other members as a main reason preventing them from getting more engaged in the network. (30)	Internal Dynamics and Perception

		POSITIVE ASPECTS	NEGATIVE ASPECTS
			Other priorities for the members are pointed as at a factor that reduces organizations' engagement in the network. (31)
		OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
External Aspects	Political Context	The fact that OPEV is the only network initiative working on PVE outside of the governmental umbrella gives it an added value. OPEV's vision of VE well places it to act as a watchdog of governmental counter-terror policies and C/PVE programs.	<p>The vague definition of which are Jordan State's vision, plan, and instruments to deal with PVE paired with the unofficial shift in PVE competences from the Ministry of Interior to an unclear space between the government and the Royal House hampers civil society's ability to work on PVE.</p> <p>PVE has become a sensitive issue in a context where sources point at C/PVE efforts to be at hands of Prince Rashid El Hassan, commander of the Special Police Force, a governmental branch formerly committed to fight terrorism which now has turned into a separate law enforcement agency known as "Daraq". (35)</p>
		Including civil society organizations like OPEV in PVE policy-making would allow the government to incorporate localized citizen-driven initiatives, providing the PVE responses with more legitimacy. (32)	The 2014 Anti Terror Law which regards offenses to the state reputation as a crime, threatens OPEV's activities and work to be restrained because of its vision on VE which includes the state as an actor that can perpetrate violent extremist acts or generate the conditions conducive to it. (36)
		The role of civil society organizations in CVE/PVE efforts has also been acknowledged by the international community (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, UNSC resolution 2178 (2014), UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism). (33)	The new context can challenge OPEV's name acceptance. Apparently, the Arabic translation of Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism coincides with the agency under control of Prince Rashid, threatening to generate state's rejection as well as that of other civil society actors, who may relate OPEV with CT efforts and intelligence. (37)
			Being the government the actor with the highest capacity to impact OPEV's work, there is a threat of being co-opted and lose legitimacy due to having to compromise OPEV's principles and raison d'être.
	Relations with Other Actors	In the event that the UNDP Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism was created, there is an opportunity that OPEV was invited and could participate in consultation processes about the National PVE Plan with the government along with other civil society organizations. Besides, OPEV members regard the creation of this organ as an opportunity that could strengthen civil's society role in PVE. (34)	Seeing OPEV's work invisibilized by the possible creation of a UNDP Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism.
Find the references in the SWOT Special References Section in the Bibliography, p.44			

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## V. Policy Recommendations

After a thorough analysis on OPEV's potential, weaknesses, and challenges posed by the Jordanian context, this paper provides with policy recommendations for the network strengthening. This section presents general action lines for each of the following areas: Members' nature, mission and values; Strategy (for the network, vis-à-vis the State, vis-à-vis other stakeholders), Capacity, Decision-making, Internal Dynamics and Perception, Internal Communication, External Communication and Visibility and Membership Expansion; as well as a detailed recommendations package, making distinction between short, mid and long term actions.

### ❖ General recommendations (GR)

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#### □ Members' nature, mission and values

- *GR1: All members need to agree and share the mission and values of the network. Common understanding on VE and how the network aims to address it has to be reinforced.*

#### □ Strategy

- *GR2: Design and adoption of a Strategic Plan for OPEV Jordan through internal consensus and in consultation with OPEV coordinators.*
- **Strategy vis-à-vis the state:** *GR3: Re-assessing the existing space for OPEV's action in the current political context.*
- **Strategy vis-à-vis other stakeholders:** *GR4: Extending OPEV's connections with other key stakeholders and integrate these exchanges into the network's structure and modus operandi.*
- **Strategy regarding inter-OPEV transnational relations:** *GR5: Exploring opportunities of collaboration with other OPEVs, enhancing the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of the network.*

#### □ Decision-making

- *GR6: Establishing clear and formal decision-making mechanisms that are inclusive and consensus-based.*



□ Capacity

- *GR7: Avoiding the expectations-capabilities gap through an adequate resource allocation.*

□ Internal dynamics and perceptions

- **Leadership:** *GR8: The leader should act as a hub agent that facilitates member's synergies and participation.*
- **Coordination:** *GR9: Developing a culture of cooperation and of the formal mechanisms to make it effective (both internally and regionally with other OPEVs).*

□ Internal Communication

- *GR10: Putting in place the necessary means to ease the exchanges between members and keep them updated with each others' activities.*

□ External Communication and Visibility

- *GR11: Upgrading OPEV's visibility and reputation vis-à-vis other stakeholders working in PVE in Jordan (including state actors, as well as international organizations) and the general public in Jordan and abroad.*

□ Membership Expansion

- *GR12: Focusing on the consolidation of the network and exploring ways of gradually opening it to new forms of collaboration that may in a future become new memberships.*

## ❖ Detailed Recommendations

The following table (Table 3.1) makes a breakdown of the general recommendations into more specific actions, classified per topic and time horizon.<sup>92</sup> Those recommendations that are consecutive in time (short-mid-long term) appear in bold color and are numbered one after the other. For further explanation of each of the detailed recommendations please see their extended version in Annex 8: Detailed Recommendations.<sup>93</sup>

Table 3.1. Detailed Recommendations Package, Executive Summary

	SHORT-TERM	MID-TERM	LONG-TERM
Member's Nature, Mission and Values	GR 1: All members need to agree and share the mission and values of the network. Common understanding on VE and how the network aims to address it has to be reinforced.		
	1.1.1. Discussing theoretically what are members' understandings about VE, with a particular focus on SGBV.	1.1.2. Developing a Charter out of members' consensus to describe what are the network principles and values.	1.1.3. Becoming a stronghold of PVE based on a broad understanding of VE in Jordan.
			1.2. Generating synergies among all the members, taking the most of their diversity.
Strategy	GR 2: Design and adoption of a strategic plan for OPEV Jordan through internal consensus and in consultation with OPEV coordinators.		
	2.1. Establishing clear and well-defined objectives and expectations.	2.4. NOVACT could set some OPEV general strategic guidelines which then the members should adapt to their own needs and context in Jordan.	2.10. Building reputation and visibility (Check <i>External Communication and Visibility</i> section).
	2.2. All members need to agree and share the mission and values of the network.	2.5. Creating an Strategic Plan for Jordan for 4 years to be adapted each year.	2.11. Engaging in joint advocacy or service delivery.
	2.3. The reason for membership needs to be the belief in the common project, not funding.	2.6. Creation of an annual work plan.	2.12. Potential strategic objectives: -Advocating for their PVE vision -Strengthening civil society role
		2.7. Offering of training sessions for the members responding to their needs. Members could be asked annually about what possible formation they might need.	
		2.8. Organization of internal workshops.	

<sup>92</sup> Short-term recommendations are those that can be implemented immediately, and are designed to be put in place in the upcoming 6 months. The mid-term comprises a wider time horizon, gathering actions to be taken in the following 2 years. Finally, by long-term recommendations we refer to decisions to be implemented in a 5 to 10 years time, depending on the network development.

<sup>93</sup> Table 3.1 gathers an executive summary of each recommendation, which are further explained in the Annex 8: Detailed recommendations.

	SHORT-TERM	MID-TERM	LONG-TERM
		2.9. Organization of joint activities as complementary to the projects of each member.	
	GR3: <i>Re-assessing the existing space for OPEV's action in the current political context.</i>		
Strategy vis-a-vis the Jordanian State	3.1. ARDD as leaders should investigate what happened on 15 March when OPEV conference was suspended and share the findings with the rest of the organizations.	3.3. Developing an alternative nomenclature for dealing with PVE issues.	3.5. Avoiding co-option and the compromise of OPEV's core principles.
	3.2. Consultation with the members on the changes in the political context and the best adaptation mechanisms.	3.4. Changing the network's name when translated to Arabic, to avoid the use of the word "Observatory" (/muraqab/).	3.6. Strategically building a relation of acceptance with the government. Once the network is consolidated and has a noticeable trajectory, act more openly as a watchdog.
	GR4: <i>Extending OPEV's connections with other key stakeholders and integrate these exchanges into the network's structure and modus operandi.</i>		
Strategy vis-a-vis other stakeholders	4.1. Establishing contact with organizations that have expressed interest on OPEV and its work.	4.2. Engaging with international actors or INGOs as a network, complementarily to the bilateral relations members may have with these actors.	4.5. Build a front for advocating together with other civil society sectors to expand civil society rights in Jordan.
		4.3. Building relations with other Jordanian local NGOs working on PVE. It may be interesting to develop an Observer status of membership within the network.	4.6. It may be interesting for NOVACT to foster contacts with other Euro-Mediterranean networks operative in Jordan (EuroMeSCo, Anna Lindh, Euromed Women), and see if there are some potential synergies in some of the projects of these networks and OPEV.
		4.4. Expand contacts throughout the Jordanian civil society working on other issues, such as culture or education.	
	GR5: <i>Exploring opportunities of collaboration with other OPEVs, enhancing the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of the network.</i>		
Transnational OPEV relations	5.1. Euro-Mediterranean OPEV should set the strategic lines of action by involving representatives from all the OPEVs.	5.2. OPEV Jordan could explore the possibility of having contact with OPEV Tunisia or OPEV Catalonia. NOVACT should set channels for these interactions to take place.	5.3. The possibility of attracting funding for common regional initiatives could be explored.
	GR6: <i>Establishing clear and formal decision-making mechanisms that are inclusive and consensus-based.</i>		
Decision-making	6.1. Decision-making by consensus should be the main mechanism to take decisions.	6.3. For decision-making by consensus to be effective it is important to develop an organizational culture that sets periodic meetings with clear agendas.	6.6. If significant enlargement happened, then the creation of a periodically elected Executive Committee would be a good idea.

	SHORT-TERM	MID-TERM	LONG-TERM
	6.2. Member organizations should agree in setting a timeline. Every year there should be an Annual Meeting. During the year, periodic meetings should be set.	6.4. The leader could be in charge of proposing the agenda, send it in advance to the rest of the members and be open to proposals by member organizations.  6.5. Ahead of the annual conference, the leader should conduct a survey to gather members' assessment of the last year and to identify expectations for the upcoming one.	
	GR7: <i>Avoiding the expectations-capabilities gap by the adequate resources allocation.</i>		
Capacity	7.1. Having resources allocated for the proposed activities.	7.3. Member organizations should look for synergies among them, and maybe some members can partner to ask for common funding.	7.4. Making network structures and cooperation among members dynamic and institutionalized enough to receive common funding within the framework of a project.
	7.2. Members who can not make a monetary contribution, can commit in terms of time, human resources or taking responsibility for common activities (ex. newsletter edition).		7.5. The network in itself (if it becomes an actor delivering common goods in terms of cooperation, research, and advocacy) may become a subject for funding in itself.
			7.6. Likewise, if OPEV Jordan creates links and connections with the other regional OPEVs, the possibility of attracting funding for common regional initiatives could be explored.
	GR8: <i>The leader should act as a hub agent that facilitates member's synergies and participation.</i>		
Leadership	8.1.1. ARDD-Legal Aid should continue its role as leader, but its functions should be discussed among all members and formally set.	8.1.2. The leader in OPEV should be acting as hub agent, gathering the rest of organizations' proposals, and generating the environment for all the members to reach common decisions.	8.1.3. If the network was to be larger in the future, member organizations could decide to create the figure of a coordinator, as an elected leader for the network.
	GR9: <i>Developing a culture of cooperation and of the formal mechanisms to make it effective (both internally and regionally with other OPEVs).</i>		
Coordination	9.1. Each member organization should define a focal point to be contacted for OPEV-related issues.	9.3. Opening channels and reciprocal lines of communication for recurring exchanges to take place.	9.5. Strengthening cooperation at the regional level and hold annual meetings and other activities with other OPEVs.
	9.2. Annual and periodic meetings should be established.	9.4. Generating "learning-by-doing" on how to work in network and encouraging member organizations to invest in relational assets.	9.6. Developing a culture of mutual cooperation and commitment to a long-term relationship.
			9.7. Developing complementarity among the members.

	SHORT-TERM	MID-TERM	LONG-TERM
Internal Communication	GR10: Putting in place the necessary means to ease the exchanges between members and keep them updated with each others' activities.		
	10.1. Asking for annual confirmation of the adhesion to the network.	10.4. Creating of a digital newsletter with the weekly or even monthly (depending on the human resources available to edit it) activities, events and news of each member.	
	10.2. Setting regular meetings attended by focal points.		
	10.3. Creation of a shared Google Group to store common information.		
External Communication / Visibility	GR11: Upgrading OPEV's visibility and reputation vis-à-vis other stakeholders working in PVE in Jordan (including state actors, as well as international organizations) and the general public in Jordan and abroad.		
	11.1.1 Creation of a section within the OPEV website for OPEV Jordan including a section highlighting membership.	11.1.2. Creation of a common facebook page for OPEV Jordan, to which all members' focal points could have access to edit it.	11.1.3. Opening the newsletter to external subscribers and other OPEV's.
	11.2. OPEV Coordination could ease the increase of its members' visibility and that of the network by publishing interviews, or other contents about them and their work.		
	11.3. A protocol should be developed in order to define how to proceed when one member of OPEV Jordan is invited to an event related to PVE.		
Members hip Expansion	GR12: Focusing on the consolidation of the network and exploring ways of gradually opening it to new forms of collaboration that may in a future become new memberships.		
	12.1.1. No expansion. Consolidating the group as it is and reassuring members' commitment.	12.1.2. Exploring the possibility of expanding the network with other civil society actors working in PVE that share the same vision.	12.1.5 Gradual network enlargement, developing different membership status for members' to retain control over the process.
		12.1.3. All members should discuss these possibility and guidelines for new membership should be developed.	
		12.1.4. Mapping of potential new partners interested joining OPEV and valuable for the network.	

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## VI. Conclusions

In conclusion, the assessment carried out throughout the elaboration of this policy paper proves that OPEV network can play an important role in PVE efforts in the Jordanian context. However, in order to do so, some external challenges and internal weaknesses have to be addressed.

External challenges are mainly related to the current political situation in the country, and more specifically with the sensitivity of PVE as a highly securitized topic and the fact that it is a competence strongly embedded in State structures. Internal weaknesses are generated by the lack of a Strategic Plan that binds members together in the pursuit of common goals and the inadequacy or insufficiency of established mechanisms for coordination and internal communication. A further relevant weakness has to do with communication practices at the external level, which is having a pernicious effect in terms of visibility and reputation, hampering the network advocacy power. The policy paper provides recommendations covering all these areas, namely: Members' nature, mission and values; Strategy (for the network, vis-à-vis the State, vis-à-vis other stakeholders), Capacity, Decision-making, Internal Dynamics and Perception, Internal Communication, External Communication and Visibility, and Membership Expansion.

Nevertheless, the original contribution to knowledge of this policy paper does not only consist of the recommendations per se, but on the whole methodology used from the theorization to the recommendations' formulation. This method is not only valid to assess other civil society initiatives but also to be used in different contexts away from Jordan. In terms of content, the added-value of the paper derives from having adopted a very specific approach to violent extremism, that allows to get an overview of the whole spectrum of political violence of extremist nature taking place in a country or region.

From a procedural approach, the combination of multiple analytical tools, including the mapping of actors, the PESL, and the SWOT, with a diversity of sources, including secondary but also primary sources, such as the periodic consultation with OPEV coordinators and the questionnaires conducted among member organizations' representatives; have nourished the paper with extensive and in depth knowledge and understanding. This combination of methods has proven essential to identify the factors to be taken into account when assessing OPEV network and formulating recommendations for its strengthening. The methodology is replicable to different contexts and for the assessment of other network initiatives.

The policy paper's ability to make a real policy contribution through its diffusion among key stakeholders in OPEV's development constitutes a further added-value. The paper will be shared with NOVACT, as well as OPEV member organizations. This is specially relevant due to the paper release's timing, as it will be handed ahead of the Conference on Prevention of Violent Extremism that will take place in Barcelona on 27-29th June 2018 hosted by NOVACT. The Conference will consist of public and academic events about PVE in the Euro-Mediterranean region organized in collaboration with the Union for the Mediterranean, but it will also gather representatives from all OPEVs to discuss internally the future of the network.

In another vein, some civil society organizations working in PVE matters in Jordan that have been consulted for the purposes of this paper have expressed their interest for the results of the policy paper, what will contribute to its dissemination. As a spill-over effect, the project has contributed to OPEV's visibility: Two of the consulted organizations have initiated contact with NOVACT to get to know more about OPEV's initiative.

Another aspect to take into account are the opened areas for future research. The elaboration of the theoretical framework and the contextualization have noted the existence of gaps in the literature regarding both the conceptualization of VE and PVE, and the different types of VE present in Jordan, being State Violence, Societal Violence and SGBV (as a form of violent extremism) under-researched topics.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that this policy paper acknowledges its limitations in the sense that all the proposed recommendations can be a source of inspiration for OPEV member organizations, but their implementation has to be a result of participative decision-making by all network's members. They have to be discussed and adopted internally, a process that on itself would serve the energization of the network's dynamics. Moreover, the limitations of the data obtained throughout the questionnaires due to the smallness of the sample has also been taken into account. The questionnaire's results have been deeply contrasted with experts' opinions and periodic consultations, and serve as providers of orientation rather than evidence.

In short, this policy paper makes it clear that OPEV has the necessary ingredients to arise as a relevant actor in PVE: its alternative vision on the matter can make a significant contribution to Jordanian society. OPEV values and mission are worth the effort for its members to revitalize the network. This policy paper has made its contribution to that goal. It is now the turn for OPEV members to move on through this long but rewarding process.





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23. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 14 (OPEV).

24. Data obtained throughout the mapping of actors and from the questionnaires conducted among civil society organizations working in PVE in Jordan. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 9 (Non-OPEV).

25. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 27 (OPEV).

26. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 29 (OPEV).
27. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 25 (OPEV).
28. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 24 (OPEV).
29. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 5 (OPEV).
30. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 26 and 28 (OPEV).
31. Data obtained from the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 28 (OPEV).
32. Anne Aly, Anne-Marie Balbi & Carmen Jacques (2015) Rethinking countering violent extremism: implementing the role of civil society, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 10:1, 3-13, DOI 10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772
33. Data obtained from the theoretical framework.
34. Data obtained from a meeting with UNDP Counter Violent Extremism Officer, Mr. Noor Khrais (Amman, November 2017) and the questionnaires conducted among OPEV member organizations' representatives. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 31 (OPEV).
35. Data obtained from the PESL analysis and in consultation with NOVACT's Mashrek Area Coordinator.

36. Data obtained from the PESL analysis, consultations hold with OPEV coordinators from NOVACT Barcelona and Jordan and from the questionnaires conducted among civil society organizations working in PVE in Jordan. See Annex 3: Analysis of the questionnaires' results. Specifically Question 9 (Non-OPEV) and 32 (OPEV).

37. *Ibid.*

# Annexes

1. Violent Extremisms interconnections in Jordan Diagram
2. Mapping of Actors (Extended Version)
3. Analysis of Questionnaires' results
4. Questionnaire for OPEV member organizations
5. Questionnaire for non-OPEV Jordanian CSOs
6. Main Points from Interviews with Network Experts
7. From Analysis to Recommendations
8. Detailed Recommendations
9. Contacts





# Annex 1


Violent Extremisms Interconnections in Jordan Diagram



## **JORDAN VIOLENT EXTREMISM MAPPING**

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The following diagram is a graphic representation of the interconnections existing between the different forms and manifestations that violent extremism takes in the Jordanian context. It has been developed on the basis of the contextualization, and serves as a guide to understand the inherent complexity and multidimensionality of violent extremism understood as a social phenomena in Jordan. The map attempts to provide a comprehensive picture of the Jordanian context by making a distinction between direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence terms, what allows to see that direct and explicit violence is just the tip of the iceberg and is usually the culmination of deeper and larger violences embedded in social norms, practices, and political and legal structures.





# Annex 2

Mapping of Actors (Extended Version)



## COMPLETE MAPPING OF ACTORS

In this section, a descriptive identification of actors working on P/CVE in Jordan will be provided. We include state, non-state as well as international actors' interventions. Thus, here it can be found who is doing what in P/CVE in Jordan, a mapping that will be useful as a basis to identify the Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (OPEV) network added value and potential in this universe of actors.

### *Jordanian State*

The Jordanian State is one of the most relevant actors in C/PVE efforts. Among the actors mapped, it is the one with the higher power of influence, having the capacity to impact on the ability of other actors to conduct their PVE activities. This is specially a concern for the civil society, who perceive their work as to be dependent on state's approval.<sup>1</sup> Different institutions within state structures play a diversity of roles presented as follows.

ACTOR	ACTION
<b>JORDANIAN STATE</b>	
Military	Global Coalition against Daesh
General Intelligence Directorate, police and Special Forces	Detection of militant activities, swift dismantling of discovered cells, and prevention of border penetration by Islamic State operatives from Syria
Legal Apparatus	2014 Anti-Terror Law
Monarchy	2004 Amman Message International "Aqaba meetings" for the "fights against terror" in January 2016
Private Security Companies	Border Security Program
Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments)	Regulation of religious discourse
Dar al-Ifta (Department for Issuing Fatwas) headed by the Grand Mufti of Jordan	
Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Combating Extremism and Violence	National Program for the Prevention of Violent Extremism
Public Security Directorate's Community Peace Center	Preventive radicalization program with local communities and civil society and a prison-based de-radicalization program
The following ministries also play a role in PVE efforts: Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MOPPA), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Youth, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. (Specially as they are partners of Un-led projects on the issue).	

<sup>1</sup> Conclusion extracted from the analysis of the questionnaires conducted among key civil society actors in Jordan. See the civil society actors consulted list in Annex 3

*International Actors*

ACTOR	ACTION
<b>UNITED NATIONS</b>	
<p><b>UNDP</b></p> <p>UNDP acknowledges the importance of Preventing Violent extremism and gives a special emphasis on the role of women and the gender dimension of PVE.</p>	<p>UNDP's National Strategy on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan - Jordan's minister of Interior signed in 2016 a joint partnership with UNDP in Jordan to support P/CVE through the development of a National Strategy to offer guidance for both government and non-government institutions working on P/CVE. The agreement is part of the project "Support to Counter-terrorism, Stabilization, and Counter-Radicalization in Jordan" funded by Japan. <a href="http://www.jo.undp.org/content/jordan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/05/17/national-strategy-on-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-in-jordan-p-cve.html">http://www.jo.undp.org/content/jordan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/05/17/national-strategy-on-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-in-jordan-p-cve.html</a></p>
<p><b>UNESCO</b></p> <p>UNESCO Member States adopted 197 EX/Decision 46 in 2015 enhance its capacity to assist on the development of PVE national strategies. Its actions are also guided by the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent VE.</p> <p>It centers on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Education to build resilience</li> <li>Media skills, counter-narratives and online coalitions</li> <li>Youth participation and empowerment</li> <li>Safeguarding cultural heritage, celebrating cultural diversity, promoting intercultural dialogue</li> <li>Building inclusive sciences and sharing natural resources</li> </ul>	<p>UNESCO launched in February 2018, a two-year project on PVE through youth empowerment in Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The project is funded by the UNCCT and Canada. It will partner with the Ministries of Youth, Education, Labour and ICT's as well as with civil society organizations, local religious leaders and universities.</p> <p>UNESCO "Networks of Mediterranean Youth" Project (NET-MED Youth) is a three-year (2014-2017) regional project implemented by UNESCO in partnership with youth organizations, institutions and partners in 10 Mediterranean countries. It is funded by the European Union. In Jordan the projects seeks to enhance youth participation and social inclusion.</p>
<b>UN WOMAN JORDAN</b>	<p>Report "Women and Violent Radicalization in Jordan" The study was commissioned by UN Woman Jordan to support the Jordanian National Commission for Women and the Jordanian Government in developing a National Action Plan for implementing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000). The research was conducted by Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development and Search for Common Ground in February and March 2016.</p> <p>The report shows how radicalism impacts women in Jordan and how their empowerment is key for PVE.</p>

ACTOR	ACTION
<b>MENA FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE</b>	<p>Regional body to counter terror financing. Jordan's financial intelligence unit, the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism financing Unit (AMLU) also belongs to the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, an informal network of international financial intelligence units that convenes in Belgium. AMLU is responsible for monitoring and disseminating U.S. sanction-designations. (Sources: U.S. Department of State, Egmont Group)</p>

ACTOR	ACTION
<p><b>EUROPEAN UNION</b></p>	<p>EU-Jordan Compact in countering violent extremism (CVE); countering the financing of terrorism; aviation and border security, including through the involvement of the EU's specialised agencies. The EU and Jordan also agreed to intensify cooperation in order to tackle the challenges of human trafficking, foreign terrorist fighters and firearms smuggling.</p> <p>Other EU Instruments like the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) has funded projects addressing tensions (read: tribal tensions) in universities as well as projects to develop the conflict sensitivity skills of organisations working with Syrian refugees.</p> <p>More indirectly, European Endowment for Democracy and the Civil Society Facility instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy also contribute to violence prevention goals.</p>
<p><b>EU Countries' agencies</b></p>	<p>The German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) is playing a relevant role in PVE work, throughout the funding of multiple programs. Netherlands and Switzerland agencies are also especially active in PVE.</p>

## Civil Society

There is a wide range of civil society actors working on P/CVE in Jordan. Organizations working on the broader sectors of cooperation for development and humanitarian aid have not been included because, despite the fact that they actually play a key role in tackling some of the root causes of violent extremism related to social and economic deprivation, this mapping focus only on those institutions directly involved in P/CVE programming. However, the authors acknowledge that the line between both kinds of intervention is blurred and distinctions are not always clear-cut. Civil society actors have been classified between those directly linked with the Jordanian state (created by royal decree and presided by royal authorities), a common phenomena in Jordan, and those which are not. Note as well that some of the small CBOs working on the field (and in many cases being the implementing partners of INGOs) may have not been identified due to a lack of accessibility to information regarding their activities.



Members of OPEV network

ACTOR	ACTION	WEBSITE
<b>JORDANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY</b>		
<b>Directly linked to the state</b>		
<b>Jordan National Commission for Women</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gender issues and women empowerment</li> <li>- Projects according to the domains of the national strategy for Jordanian women</li> <li>- Strategic line 2.3 deals with PVE from a gender perspective.</li> </ul>	<a href="http://www.women.jo">http://www.women.jo</a>
<b>Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community Development Centres (CDC) for Youth Training and Empowerment</li> </ul>	<a href="http://www.johud.org.jo/ParticipationAndRights">http://www.johud.org.jo/ParticipationAndRights</a>
<b>National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Human rights monitoring</li> </ul>	<a href="http://www.nchr.org.jo/User_Site/Site/View_Article.aspx?type=2&amp;ID=967">http://www.nchr.org.jo/User_Site/Site/View_Article.aspx?type=2&amp;ID=967</a>
<b>The Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (RIIFS)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Religious issues, with particular reference to Christianity in Arab and Islamic society</li> </ul>	<a href="http://www.riifs.org/index.php/en/">http://www.riifs.org/index.php/en/</a>



ACTOR	ACTION	WEBSITE
<b>JORDANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY</b>		
<b>WANA Institute</b>	- Research Work on Prevention of Violent Extremism (Religion for Peace and Development in the WANA Region)	<a href="http://wanainstitute.org/en">http://wanainstitute.org/en</a>
<b>Non-linked to the State</b>		
<b>Al-Hayat Center</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "Countering Radicalization and Enhancing the Culture of Tolerance" Project</li> <li>- "Empowering CBOs to Prevent and Tackle Violent Extremism at the Grassroots Level" Project</li> <li>- "Building Partnership among Religious Leaders (Imam's and Waedat) to Counter Violent Extremism in Jordan" Project</li> </ul>	<a href="http://www.hayatcenter.org">http://www.hayatcenter.org</a>
<b>Al-Ofiq Centre for Development and Dialogue</b>	Peace and human rights	<a href="https://arab.org/directory/the-dialogue-center/">https://arab.org/directory/the-dialogue-center/</a>
<b>ARDD - Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development</b>	Promotion of Human Rights: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Raising legal awareness and empowerment.</li> <li>- Encouraging law firms to provide legal aid to marginalized people (focus on refugees and migrants)</li> <li>- Acting to develop justice in Jordan and in the ME as a whole</li> </ul> Research on PVE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Research on conflict and VE.</li> <li>- Research on PVE vectors throughout participatory research with women.</li> </ul>	<a href="http://ardd-jo.org">http://ardd-jo.org</a>
<b>At Ruwwad</b>	Education, youth volunteerism, and grassroots organizing.	<a href="http://ruwwad.net/our-mission">http://ruwwad.net/our-mission</a>
<b>Athar Association for Youth Development</b>	Enhancing the development capacities of the young, and creating a safe youth environment; in order to combat the extremist thought by moderate thought, renounce violence in Jordanian universities, empower women and combat harassment.	<a href="http://atharsociety.org/english.php#">http://atharsociety.org/english.php#</a>
<b>Durrat al Manal for Development and Training</b>	Capacity-building through Development and Humanitarian response programs in education, Health and Nutrition, Social protection, Human and Child Rights, Family protection and Fundraising. Works on sexual education for girls in minor detention centers.	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/durratalmanal.org.jo/">https://www.facebook.com/durratalmanal.org.jo/</a>
<b>I-Dare</b>	Preventing Violent Extremism Project They work as an open platform, not as an NGO, which tries to strengthen youth in all the territory fostering their initiatives. They focus on alternative narratives for the prevention of VE	<a href="http://i-dare.org/en/projects/pve/">http://i-dare.org/en/projects/pve/</a>

ACTOR	ACTION	WEBSITE
<b>JORDANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY</b>		
<b>Identity Center for Human Development</b>	Youth Leaders initiative; to create a network of young activists in Jordan, and prepare them to be leaders on local and national level. Jordan Reform Watch; to monitor the progress of the reform process taking place in Jordan and provide reports, analysis and recommendations. Elections Observation; Identity Center is considered as a specialist institution in Electoral issues, including observation and training of observers.	<a href="http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/members/identity-center-human-development">http:// www.annalindhfoundation.org/ members/identity-center- human-development</a>
<b>Justice Centre for Legal Aid</b>	Legal aid, equal access to justice	<a href="http://www.jcla-org.com/en">http://www.jcla-org.com/en</a>
<b>Karak Creativity Club</b>	Youth empowerment	<a href="http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/karak-club-fostering-young-peoples-creativity-employability">http://www.jordantimes.com/ news/local/karak-club- fostering-young-peoples- creativity-employability</a>
<b>Leaders of Tomorrow</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Diwanieh: They used to organize spontaneous street debates in public places in many cities of Jordan until the government shut down one of them regarding death penalty. Since then, it has been complicated to continue with these kind of activities because they cannot get permissions for the events.</li> <li>- White Walls: Enable Jordanians to voice their expressions on sensitive issues.</li> <li>- MO7AKA: Promote empathy and understanding through eye-opening experiences and discussion social, political and gender issues.</li> </ul>	<a href="http://www.leadersot.org">http://www.leadersot.org</a>
<b>Mizan Law Group for Human Rights</b>	Human rights Gender issues (Honour crimes) Assistance to victims of torture	<a href="https://euromedrights.org/members/mizan-law-group-for-human-rights-mlghr/">https://euromedrights.org/ members/mizan-law-group- for-human-rights-mlghr/</a>
<b>Sisterhood is Global Institute Jordan</b>	Women, human rights and democratic participation	<a href="http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/members/sisterhood-global-institute-jordan-sigi-jmy-mhd-ldwly-ltdmn-lns">http:// www.annalindhfoundation.org/ members/sisterhood-global- institute-jordan-sigi-jmy-mhd- ldwly-ltdmn-lns</a>

ACTOR	ACTION	WEBSITE
<b>JORDANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY</b>		
<b>West and East Center for Development</b>	<p>Building peace, respect and dialogue in Jordanian and International society</p> <p>Empowerment</p> <p>Capacity-building</p> <p>Projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-“Ambassadors for dialogue”, which is a program run between Danish, Egyptian and Jordanian partners in order to promote dialogue amongst the youth.</li> <li>-They organize forums, public debates, workshops and activities in the different universities through all Jordan. One of the topics they have been discussing was PVE and safety in Jordan.</li> <li>-They engage with activists to discuss about diversity and tolerance.</li> <li>-They are currently waiting for the approval of the “Non violence academy” which would teach about peaceful means and peacebuilding through sports and art.</li> </ul>	<p><a href="http://www.wecenterfordevelopment.org/en/">http://www.wecenterfordevelopment.org/en/</a></p>
<b>Other organizations working under Anna Lindt umbrella, conducting work with a PVE component in Jordan</b>	<p>AL-Tamayouz Cooperative Society</p> <p>Amman Center for Human Rights Studies</p> <p>Arab Centre for Consulting and Training Services (AWT) - المركز العربي للخدمات الاستشارات والتدريب</p> <p>Arab Network for Civic Education-ANHRE</p> <p>Blue Umbrella for training and community development</p> <p>Building Bridges Association (جمعية بناء الجسور)</p> <p>Equality Center for Civil Society Development (ECCSD) مركز مساواة لتنمية المجتمع المدني</p> <p>Generations For Peace</p> <p>Higher Council for Youth</p>	<p>Mapped through Anna Lindt Coordinators Spain-Jordan contacts</p>

*International Civil Society*

ACTOR	ACTION	
ActionAid Arab Regional Initiative	Research Youth Perspective on Community Cohesiveness for Action Aid (Danish-Arab Partnership Programme)	<a href="http://actionaid.org/arab-region/our-work">http://actionaid.org/arab-region/our-work</a>
Dignity- Danish Institute Against Torture	Fight against torture	<a href="https://stoptorture.today/about-dignity/">https://stoptorture.today/about-dignity/</a>
Mercy Corps	Report From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria's Violent Extremist Groups	<a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/jordan-jihad-lure-syrias-violent-extremist-groups">https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/jordan-jihad-lure-syrias-violent-extremist-groups</a>
International Youth Foundation	Youth Empowerment	<a href="https://www.iyfnet.org/country/jordan">https://www.iyfnet.org/country/jordan</a>
Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation	Peace-building	<a href="http://old.kvinnatillkvinna.se/en/jordan">http://old.kvinnatillkvinna.se/en/jordan</a>
National Democratic Institute	Democratization throughout activist empowerment	<a href="https://www.ndi.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/jordan">https://www.ndi.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/jordan</a>
NOVACT Institute for Nonviolent Action	Barcelona Conference. Towards a new paradigm, Preventing Violent Extremism Seminar “Challenging the dominant discourse and developing alternatives” in Jordan Participative research on PVE Non-Violent Communication and Action	<a href="http://novact.org">http://novact.org</a>
Penal Reform International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ensure that criminal justice systems reflect international standards and HR law:</li> <li>- Promotion of non-custodial alternatives</li> <li>- Child-friendly criminal justice system</li> <li>- Improvement of prison conditions and prevention of ill-treatment</li> <li>- Gender-sensitive responses to women offending the abolition of the death penalty</li> <li>- Participant on UNODC discussions on radicalization and contribution to the drafting for the UNODC Handbook on Radicalization</li> <li>- Organized the international roundtable “Preventing Radicalization in Prisons: Developing a Coordinated and Effective Approach”, hosted in Amman in 2015</li> <li>- Jointly organized the Consultation on Preventing Violent Extremism held in Amman in 2017 with UNDP and UNODC <a href="http://www.rbasknowledgeplatform.org/Docs/10199/Doc10383.pdf">http://www.rbasknowledgeplatform.org/Docs/10199/Doc10383.pdf</a></li> </ul>	<a href="https://www.penalreform.org">https://www.penalreform.org</a>
Search for Common Ground	Peace-building. Youth empowerment (focus on girls)	<a href="https://www.sfcg.org/tag/jordan-projects/">https://www.sfcg.org/tag/jordan-projects/</a>
Young Arab Voices	Youth empowerment	<a href="http://www.youngarabvoices.org">http://www.youngarabvoices.org</a>

## *Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism Network*

OPEV	
<p>The Observatory to Prevent Extremist Violence (OPEV) is a platform of civil society organisations from across the Euro-Mediterranean Region which work to prevent violent extremism from a constructive perspective. The platform coordinates efforts to follow-up the implementation of the Plan of Action of the Euro-Mediterranean civil society to prevent all forms of violent extremism that resulted from the Barcelona Conference in January 2017. The OPEV in Jordan is composed by the following organizations:</p>	
ARDD - Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development	Human rights Social justice Youth empowerment Participatory research on PVE
Durrat al Manal for Development and Training	Empowerment of minors in detention centers
Jordan National Commission for Women	PVE from a gender perspective
Leaders of Tomorrow	Public Debates Freedom of expression Youth empowerment
NOVACT Institute for Non-Violent Action	Civil society empowerment throughout non-violent action PVE research
Penal Reform International	PVE in prisons
West and East Center for Development	International, regional and national public debates Social activists empowerment Debates in universities

# Annex 3

*Analysis of Questionnaires' results*



## QUESTIONNAIRES ANALYSIS

In this section the main findings obtained throughout the questionnaires are presented. Two different questionnaires were conducted, one among key civil society stakeholders working in PVE in Jordan and an other adapted to OPEV member organizations. The first questionnaire was sent to the representatives of the main organizations identified in the mapping of actors, but it has been difficult to get their responses despite counting with NOVACT and IEMed as supporters in the process.

Consulted organizations were: Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD), The Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (RIIFS), Al Hayat Center, WANA Institute, Mercy Corps, Dignity, Identity Center for Human Development, and I-Dare. The sample is made up by 75% Jordanian organizations and 25% international ones. Out of the Jordanians half are linked to the state and the other half are independent. This distribution has served as a representation of Jordanian civil society cosmos. However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the data obtained throughout the questionnaires due to the smallness of the sample. Therefore, questionnaire's results have been deeply contrasted with experts' opinions and periodic consultations, and serve as providers of orientation rather than evidence. Due to confidentiality reasons, respondent organizations' names will not be specified in the analysis of the answers. The table below provides with an analysis of the surveyed sample, which includes answers from the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (RIIFS), WANA Institute, Mercy Corps, Dignity, Identity Center for Human Development, and I-Dare.

CONSULTED ORGANIZATIONS			
		Linked to the state	Non-Linked
Jordanian organizations	6	3	3
International organizations	2 (one European, another American)		
RESPONDENT ORGANIZATIONS			
Jordanian organizations	4	2	2
International organizations	2 (one European, another American)		

Regarding OPEV member organizations, all members were contacted. Despite pressures both by the authors of the paper and NOVACT's Country Representative in Jordan, only a half of members sent their responses back, namely ARDD, Durrat Al Manal and East and West Center. Again, the limitations of the available sample has been acknowledged, and questionnaire results have been used only as an orientation. However, it has to be stressed that organizations' answers have contributed with very relevant insights for the development of this paper's analysis. OPEV organizations' perspective has been strongly taken into account. The fact that half of members have not participated and have not given response to the regional coordinator calls has also been grasped in the analysis as a sign of low engagement due to lack of commitment or lack of (time) resources in relation to work overload. Respondent members will not be identified in the results' analysis due to confidentiality reasons.

Find in the next pages a content assessment of the main findings obtained through the questionnaires.



## Questionnaires Analysis Main Points

### 1. Civil society is suited to address most of VE forms

Consulted civil society organizations agree on the fact that civil society is suited to address a wide range of manifestations taken by VE, specially violence against women, hate speech in social networks, tribal violence and state-sponsored violence. However, they differ regarding the extent to which civil society can play an important role regarding violence against the LGBTBI community, with half of respondents pointing at a important contribution to make what others consider that civil society is not well-suited to address that issue. Jihadi-salafist violence is also a topic that generated opposite answers from respondents. While 60% of respondents considered that civil society is suited to address it to a high extent, 20% opted for a medium extent whereas the remaining 20% pointed at not suited at all. One of the consulted organizations made a distinction between the prevention of bomb attacks, in which civil society is not able to play a role, and the foreign fighters phenomena, being civil society suited to address it to a very high extent.

### 2. The political environment in among the main challenges for civil society to be active in PVE

According to consulted civil society organizations, the main challenges for civil society to work on PVE in Jordan arise firstly from a lack of funding for long-terms programmes and the political environment. Specifically, the recent restrictions on civil society posed by laws such as the 2015 AntiTerror Law and the lack of support by authorities to civil society initiatives when it comes to PVE are pointed at as main challenges (Q8 Non-OPEV).

For OPEV members in specific, the first reason is the lack of support by authorities to civil society initiatives when it comes to PVE, followed by the recent restrictions on civil society posed by laws such as the 2015 AntiTerror Law. Interestingly, OPEV members note the use of the term of VE as a source of challenges in itself (Q32 OPEV).

### 3. The government matters

The government is considered by consulted civil society organizations as the actor with a higher impact on their ability to carry out work and projects in PVE. The second actor with a higher influence are community groups, including religious leaders, community leaders, local

governments. One of the consulted organizations pointed at youth groups as a key stakeholder (Q10 Non-OPEV).

#### **4. Networking works**

All consulted civil society organizations regard coalitions of civil society organizations to be a useful tool to overcome civil society challenges in Jordan. (Q9 Non-OPEV).

#### **5. OPEV has a problem of visibility**

50% of non-OPEV consulted organizations did not know the OPEV. Moreover, those who did not consider it a relevant actor in PVE. However, most of respondents knew OPEV member organizations, being some of them recognized for their PVE work as relevant stakeholders. (Q11, 12, 13 Non-OPEV)

Most of OPEV members acknowledge this problem in terms of visibility as they think that other stakeholders working on PVE in Jordan do not know the network (Q21 OPEV)

#### **6. OPEV members have a strong common understanding of VE**

OPEV member organizations coincide in their understanding on VE and the different forms it may take, as all of them acknowledge forms of state-sponsored violence, societal violence, jihadi-salafist violence and hate speech as VE manifestations. There is only a certain imbalance with regards to sexual and gender-based violence, which is not considered VE by one of the members (Q1 OPEV). Respondent organizations work mostly on violence against women, violence against refugees, hate speech in social networks and police violence (Q2 OPEV).

A common understanding about their approach when addressing VE phenomena, they all regard themselves as organizations addressing the drivers and roots causes that may lead to the irruption of VE, from a political, social and economic perspective (Q3 OPEV).

#### **7. OPEV members' motivations to network have not been met**

The main motivation for OPEV members to join the network was gaining leverage to advocate for OPEV's values and vision regarding VE (Q4 OPEV). And that is the goal on which the network has been more able to deliver outcomes, although to a low extent (Q5 OPEV). The expectations for networking have not been met by the network's performance (Q5 OPEV).

Nevertheless, all consulted OPEV members value the network as fundamental in PVE efforts in Jordan. One of the organizations emphasised the fact that OPEV would be able to play a fundamental role ‘‘especially when a serious strategic plan to address PVE has been set.’’ (Q6 OPEV)

## **8. There is room for improving internal dynamics: Decision-making, Coordination, Leadership and Strategy**

### *Decision-making*

All members are willing to participate in OPEV decision-making processes (Q7 OPEV) and all consider that there are effective channels to participate in decision-making (Q8 OPEV). Regarding decision-making mechanisms, members agree on the fact that few decisions are taken multilaterally including all OPEV members. However, there is some unbalance between organizations that consider that most decisions are taken unilaterally and bilaterally, and those which point at multilateral decisions including only some members as the most used mechanism (Q9 OPEV).

Decision-making is regarded to a medium-high extent as horizontal and democratic. However, the answers of member organizations do not allow to reach further conclusions on the characteristics of decision-making nor its quality. (Q10 OPEV)

There is a bit of confusion regarding the periodicity of meetings, as some members point at annual meetings while others at only trimestral ones. Probably it has to do with the fact of the prevalence of decision-making that does not involve the totality of network's members. (Q11 OPEV).

### *Coordination and perceptions*

All members consider the network as a useful tool to avoid overlapping (Q14 OPEV). However, most of consulted OPEV members do not know what other member organizations are doing in relation to PVE (Q12 OPEV). A malfunctioning network structure has been pointed at as the main factor preventing member organizations to further involve in the network (Q28 OPEV). Some organizations have no relations at all with some of the other network members (Q24 OPEV).

Most members assess the relationship of the members of the network as cooperative, however, some of them consider it as competitive (Q25 OPEV). According to members' self-perception, there is an unequal degree of involvement in the network by the different

organizations, being the leader the most involved (Q26 OPEV). Most of consulted organizations regard the lack of commitment by other members as a main reasons preventing them from getting more engaged in the network (Q28 OPEV). However, all consulted members regard themselves as contributing to a medium-high extent to OPEV, mainly through building relationships with community groups and general public, providing accommodation for project activities, network meetings, workshops, etc. and generating visibility and reputation (Q27 OPEV).

### *Leadership*

Leadership has been assessed positively by members. Although there is room for improvement regarding the leaders' ability to convene and facilitate productive interactions between the members (Q29). The leaders have a strong relation with all other organizations (Q24 OPEV), what makes them suited for leadership tasks.

### *Strategy*

Regarding strategy, most consulted organizations agree on the fact that having a Strategy or Action Plan would be beneficial for the network (Q16 OPEV). Being member of the network is part of the organizations' strategy to a medium extent. The leader organization is the member that acknowledges its membership as most strategical (Q22 OPEV). Being part of the network affects organizations' performance to a medium-low extent (Q23 OPEV).

## **9. Both internal and external communication practices are weak.**

Member organizations evaluate OPEV's internal communication practices negatively (Q17 OPEV). It is worth mentioning that one of the consulted member organizations did not know if OPEV Jordan had a Strategy or Action Plan (Q15 OPEV). Member organizations consider that the network has been able to contribute to the exchange of information, knowledge, expertise, lessons learned and good practices only to a medium-low extent (Q18 OPEV).

External Communication practices are also assessed as improvable (Q19 OPEV), being able to deliver to relational goals with other actors only to a medium-low extent (Q20 OPEV).

## **10. Members would like NOVACT to involve further**

Consulted member organizations would like that NOVACT facilitated the contact and exchanges with other OPEVs and that NOVACT would further involve in OPEV Jordan

development. NOVACT's role as regional coordinator is considered effective to a medium-high extent (Q30 OPEV).

### **11. The creation of an UNDP Observatory for the PVE would be an opportunity**

The creation of a Jordanian Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism by UNDP is regarded by all consulted member organizations as an opportunity for OPEV Jordan since the creation of such organ would strengthen the civil society's role in PVE in Jordan. (Q31 OPEV)

### **Questionnaires open questions**

This section gathers some of the OPEV members' main answers to open questions posed in the questionnaires.

#### **OQ1. How would you improve OPEV decision-making process?**

“In Jordan, all members are really busy and more coordination and more serious actions should be taken by the members to work together hand in hand to have better effects on PVE matters and objectives.”

“To develop a mechanism of decision-making by making an organizational structure or bylaws that clarify the management and responsibilities of each entity / organization, and specify a secretariat for this Alliance. But I think that will not work, because most of the members of the Alliance cannot be committed because of their work and projects.”

#### **OQ2. How would you improve OPEV's internal coordination?**

“There should be at least a quarterly meeting with members in order to coordinate our activities if they fall within the same domain.”

“I think if there was funds/grants, and each organization carried out one project element / component under the management of one secretariat, or a large project managed by an organization, and have under it small grant/projects to be implemented through the different organizations or some of them in the alliance, there would be good cooperation.”

“We are working on it!”

**OQ3. How would you improve OPEV's communication, internal and external?**

“From what we see, OPEV needs more visibility and more understanding of the Jordanian context, the sensitivity of OPEV objectives sometimes needs to be dealt with delicately and to be introduced in a language for the common Jordanian to understand and to not offend decisions-makers especially. It will be very important in decision-making. PVE can reach its goals when it works with the right partners.”

“Through joint activities that will be carried out by the organizations of the Alliance and that have concrete results. This contributes to cooperation among the organizations, and to have the attention of the local and international organizations in addition to the media and government to the role and importance of the Alliance.”

**OQ4. What would you do to enhance OPEV member's participation?**

“To share a strategy that will lead the OPEV and its members to work together and coordinate their objectives, activities and advocacy plans.”

“I believe that finding resources, fund and joint activities will increase our involvement in the Alliance.”

# Annex 4

Questionnaire for OPEV member organizations



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# QUESTIONNAIRE

## OPEV member:

Dear respondent,

You have been contacted to respond this questionnaire as representative of an organization member of the OPEV Jordan network. This questionnaire aims to collect information about OPEV's current practices as well as the weaknesses identified by its member organizations. The results will serve as the basis for a research and policy paper on how to revitalize the network.

Note that your responses are voluntary and will be confidential, your organization will not be named.

This questionnaire should take around 20-30 minutes to complete.

**Thank you very much** for taking the time to answer it.

**This survey is being conducted in collaboration with NOVACT by International Relations students from Ramon Llull University in Barcelona (Spain), in the framework of their final degree thesis.**



# BLOCK 1

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## VIOLENT EXTREMISM

# THE CONCEPT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

**Q1. Which of the following kinds of violence would you categorize as violent extremism (VE)? Mark with an X**

1.	State-sponsored violence: Police violence	
2.	State-sponsored violence: Shelling against civilians during war	
3.	State-sponsored violence: Torture in prison	
4.	State-sponsored violence: Death penalty	
5.	Tribal violence	
6.	Violence between East Bankers and Jordanians of Palestinian origin	
7.	Violence against women	
8.	Violence against the LGBTBI community	
9.	Violence against refugees	
10.	Bomb attacks in the name of Islam	
11.	Foreign fighters joining ISIS or AlQaeda	
12.	Foreign fighters joining the Free Syrian Army	
13.	Hate speech in social networks	
14.	Others	

**Q2. To what extent addressing the following kinds of violence is a priority for your organization. Please, rank them from 0 to 5 according to the degree of importance.**

	Not a priority						High priority	
State-sponsored violence: Police violence	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
State-sponsored violence: Shelling against civilians during war	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
State-sponsored violence: Torture in prison	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
State-sponsored violence: Death penalty	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Tribal violence	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Violence between East Bankers and Jordanians of Palestinian origin	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Violence against women	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Violence against the LGBTBI community	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	

Violence against refugees	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Bomb attacks in the name of Islam	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Foreign fighters joining ISIS or AlQaeda	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Foreign fighters joining the Free Syrian Army	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Hate speech in social networks	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Others							

## RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

**Q3. Which of the following statements better defines your organization's actions. Please choose one:**

1.	Preventing and combating acts of terrorism, understood only as a non-state actor form of violence	
2.	Preventing and combating VE only as, and when, conducive to non-state actors terrorism	
3.	Preventing and combating VE from a human security approach, emphasizing protection from all violence, terrorist or state-sponsored	
4.	Addressing the drivers and roots causes that may lead to the irruption of VE, from a political, social and economic perspective	
5.	None of the above	

# BLOCK 2

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OPEV - OBSERVATORY FOR THE PREVENTION  
OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN JORDAN

## GENERAL ASSESSMENT

**Q4. To what extent the following factors were a motivation for your organization to join OPEV? Please, rank them from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent	Very high extent					
<b>Possibility of exchanging information, learning from other members</b> e.g., to learn more about crises and what each organization is doing, to share program approaches and identify best practices or to hear about innovative approaches to addressing common problems	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<b>Coordinating policies, programs, or activities</b> e.g., to address issues such as duplication or gaps or to maximize use of resources for common purposes	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<b>Obtaining common funding</b> e.g., to augment the resources of each individual member or to allocate program funds in a given sector or theme to a range of individual organizations	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<b>Gaining leverage to advocate for OPEV's values and vision regarding VE, which my organization shares</b> e.g., to carry out an advocacy campaign for policy or social change or to develop joint programs for service delivery	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
<b>Others:</b> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

**Q5. To what extent has OPEV delivered on these goals? Please, rank from 0 to 5. If ranked less than 3, explain in 2 lines how would you improve these outcomes? Please, rank them from 0 to 5. If ranked less than 3, please, explain in two lines how would you improve these outcomes**

	Very low extent	Very high extent
Possibility of exchanging information, learning from other members	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Coordinating policies, programs, or activities	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Obtaining common funding	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Gaining leverage to advocate for OPEV's values and vision regarding VE, which my organization shares	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Others: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

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**Q6. To what extent do you consider OPEV's role as fundamental in PVE efforts in Jordan?  
Please, rank from 0 to 5.**

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Very low extent			Very high extent			
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

## DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

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**Q7. Is your organization willing to participate in OPEV decision-making process?**

---

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know

---

**Q8. Are there adequate and effective channels for your organization to participate in decision-making?**

---

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know

---

**Q9. To what extent are decisions taken in the following ways?**

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	Very low extent	Very high extent
Multilaterally including all OPEV members	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Multilaterally including only some of OPEV members	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Bilaterally	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Unilaterally	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	

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**Q10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?**

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	Very low extent	Very high extent
In general, OPEV decision-making is effective	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
OPEV decision-making is horizontal and democratic	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
OPEV decision making is hierarchical and top-down	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
OPEV decision-making involves too long decision-making processes	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
OPEV members' roles and responsibilities are clear	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Decisions taken are implemented	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
There is no decision-making process at all	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	



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**Q11. A meeting with all members takes place...**

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- ☐ Every week
- ☐ Every month
- ☐ Every three months
- ☐ Every year
- ☐ Never

***Have a say!!***

***Q1. How would you improve OPEV decision-making process?***

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## COORDINATION

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**Q12. Do you know about the actions carried out by other OPEV members in PVE?**

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☐ Yes

☐ No

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**Q13. Do you work with any other OPEV member in any initiative? If yes, could you briefly mention in which one and with whom?**

---

☐ Yes \_\_\_\_\_

☐ No

☐ I don't know

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**Q14. Do you consider the network useful when it comes to avoiding overlapping? If not, could you explain why?**

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☐ Yes

☐ No \_\_\_\_\_

☐ I don't know

***Have a say!!***

***Q2. How would you improve OPEV's internal coordination?***

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# STRATEGY

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**Q15. Does OPEV Jordan have an Strategy or Action Plan for Jordan?**

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- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know

---

**Q16. If not, do you think having a Strategy and Actions Plan could be beneficial for the network?**

---

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know

# COMMUNICATION PRACTICES

## Internal communication

**Q17. How do you evaluate OPEV's internal communication practices? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

Very bad						Very good
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	

**Q18. To what extent does OPEV Jordan contribute to the following goals? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent	Very high extent
The exchange of information between members	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Sharing of knowledge and expertise	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Sharing of lessons learned	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Sharing of good practices among members	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	

## External communication

**Q19. How do you evaluate OPEV's external communication practices? (with other actors and the general public) Please, rank from 0 to 5**

Very bad						Very good
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	

**Q20. To what extent does OPEV external communication contributes to the following goals? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent	Very high extent
Building relationships with other actors	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Improving reputation	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Coordination with government	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Coordination with UN initiatives	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Coordination with other civil society organizations	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	

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**Q21. Do you think other stakeholders working in PVE in Jordan know about OPEV?**

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- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know

***Have a say!!***

***How would you improve OPEV's communication, internal and external?***

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## YOUR PERCEPTION

**Q22. To what extent being a member of the OPEV network is part of your organization's strategy?**

Very low extent				Very high extent		
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

**Q23. To what extent does being a member of OPEV impacts your organization's performance? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

Very low extent				Very high extent		
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

**Q24. To what extent your organization has a strong relation with the other OPEV members? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent				Very high extent		
ARDD-LegalAid	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Jordan National Commission for Women	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
East and West Centre for Sustainable Development	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Penal Reform International	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Durrat Al Manal for Development and Training	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Shoman Foundation and Leaders of Tomorrow	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
NOVACT Institute for Nonviolent Action	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

**Q25. How do you assess the relationship of the members of the network. Rank from 1 to 5 from very competitive to very cooperative**

Very competitive			Very cooperative		
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

## PARTICIPATION

**Q26. To what extent does your organization involve actively in the network? Please rank from 0 to 5**

Very low extent			Very high extent		
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

**Q27. To what extent does your organization contribute to OPEV with the following elements? Please, rank them from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent			Very high extent			
Information capture (local knowledge, social conditions)	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Information dissemination (social networks, published materials...)	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Relationships with UN agencies and donors	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Relationships with the government	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Relationships with community groups, general public...	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Accommodation for project activities, network meetings, workshops...	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Visibility and reputation	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know



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**Q28. Which of the following factors, if any, prevent you to further involve in OPEV? Please, chose the ones which constitute a real impediment for you and rank them (1: main impediment)**

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1.	Limitation of time	
2.	Limitation of resources	
3.	Other priorities of the organization	
4.	Malfunctioning OPEV's structure	
5.	Coalitions do not work	
6.	OPEV members are competitors	
7.	Lack of commitment of the rest of the members	
8.	Costs outweighs the benefits	
9.	Others: _____	

***Have a say!!***

***Q4. What would you do to enhance OPEV member's participation?***

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## LEADERSHIP

**Q29. To what extent do you consider that OPEV's leader (ARDD) has been able to contribute to the following:**

	Very low extent			Very high extent		
Facilitating joint action and coordinating the network's activities.	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Building consensus and resolving conflict.	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Convening and facilitating productive interactions between the members	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Empowering other members of the network to be proactive.	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

**Q30. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent			Very high extent		
I consider NOVACT's role as the regional coordinator as effective	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
I would like that NOVACT would further involve in OPEV Jordan development	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
I would like that NOVACT facilitated the contact and exchanges with other OPEVs	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

# BLOCK 3

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OPEV JORDAN'S WORK IN CONTEXT

# EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

**Q31. In the case that UNDP Jordan decided to develop a Jordanian Observatory for the Prevention of Violent Extremism, how would this affect your organization and OPEV? Please, choose one from the following:**

- ☐ It might be a challenge since it could set OPEV Jordan aside and invisibilize its role
- ☐ It could be an opportunity for OPEV Jordan since the creation of such organ would strengthen the civil society's role in PVE in Jordan
- ☐ It would not affect the role of my organization
- ☐ My organization was not aware of this possibility

**Q32. To what extent are the following factors challenging for civil society to work on PVE in Jordan? Please rank from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent			Very high extent		
Recent restrictions on civil society posed by laws such as the 2015 AntiTerror Law	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Competition for funds and visibility among civil society organizations	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Lack of social participation and engagement	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Lack of funding for long-term programmes	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
The use of the term of VE	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Lack of support by authorities to civil society initiatives when it comes to PVE	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Others: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

**Q33. Which of the following actors have a real impact on the ability of your organization to carry out its work and projects on C/PVE? Please chose 3 and rank them (1: main impact)**

1.	Government	
2.	UN	
3.	EU	
4.	International NGOs	
5.	Jordanian NGOs	
6.	Community Groups working in PVE (Religious leaders, community leaders, local governments)	
7.	Others: _____	

**You have successfully completed the questionnaire. Thank you very much for your time.**

# Annex 5

Questionnaire for non-OPEV  
Jordanian Civil Society Organizations



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# QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear respondent,

You have been contacted to respond this questionnaire as representative of a civil society organization working directly or indirectly in the prevention of violence in Jordan. This questionnaire aims to collect information about current practices of and challenges faced-by civil society in Jordan. The results will serve as the basis for a research on civil society role and a policy paper on how to revitalize a network of organizations working in Prevention of Violent Extremism in Jordan, named OPEV (Observatory for the Prevention of VE). Note that your responses are voluntary and will be confidential, your organization will not be named.

This questionnaire should take around 10 minutes to complete.

**Thank you very much** for taking the time to answer it.

**This survey is being conducted in collaboration with NOVACT by International Relations students from Ramon Llull University in Barcelona (Spain), in the framework of their final degree thesis.**

# BLOCK 1

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## VIOLENT EXTREMISM



## VIOLENT EXTREMISM CONCEPT

**Q1. Which of the following kinds of violence would you categorize as violent extremism? Please, mark with an X in the first column. Of these, which ones do you consider to be present in Jordanian society? Please, mark with an X in the second column.**

	Types of Violence	Violent Extremist Violence	Violence present in Jordan
1.	State-sponsored violence: Police violence		
2.	State-sponsored violence: Shelling against civilians during war		
3.	State-sponsored violence: Torture in prison		
4.	State-sponsored violence: Death penalty		
5.	Tribal violence		
6.	Violence between East Bankers and Jordanians of Palestinian origin		
7.	Violence against women		
8.	Violence against the LGTBI community		
9.	Violence against refugees		
10.	Bomb attacks in the name of Islam		
11.	Foreign fighters joining ISIS or AlQaeda		
12.	Foreign fighters joining the Free Syrian Army		
13.	Hate speech in social networks		
14.	Others		

---

**Q2. To what extent addressing the following kinds of violence is a priority for your organization. Please, rank them from 0 to 5 according to the degree of importance.**

---

	Not a priority						High priority	
Police violence	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Shelling against civilians during war	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Torture in prison	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Death penalty	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Tribal violence	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Violence against women	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Violence against the LGTBI community	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Violence against refugees	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Bomb attacks in the name of Islam	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Foreign fighters joining ISIS or AlQaeda	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Foreign fighters joining the Free Syrian Army	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Hate speech in social networks	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Others	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	

## RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM (VE)

---

**Q3. Which of the following statements better defines your organization's actions regarding VE. Please choose one:**

---

1.	Preventing and combating acts of terrorism, understood only as a non-state actor form of violence	
2.	Preventing and combating VE only as, and when, conducive to non-state actors terrorism	
3.	Preventing and combating VE from a human security approach, emphasizing protection from all violence, terrorist or state-sponsored	
4.	Addressing the drivers and roots causes that may lead to the irruption of VE, from a political, social and economic perspective	
5.	None of the above	

# BLOCK 2

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CIVIL SOCIETY

## CIVIL SOCIETY ROLE

**Q4. For the following types of violence, please, indicate to what extent do you regard the civil society to be well suited to address them?**

	Very poorly suited (not the role of civil society)			Very well suited (it is the role of civil society)		
Police violence	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Shelling against civilians during war	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Torture in prison	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Death penalty	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Tribal violence	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Violence between East Bankers and Jordanians of Palestinian origins	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Violence against women	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Violence against the LGTBI community	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Violence between refugees and locals	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Bomb attacks in the name of Islam	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Foreign fighters joining ISIS or AlQaeda	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Foreign fighters joining the Free Syrian Army	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Hate speech in social networks	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Others:	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

**Q5. Which are the civil society actors that you consider more relevant when it comes to addressing Violent Extremism in Jordan? Please, name at least two**

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

---

**Q6. To what extent are the following factors challenging for civil society to work on PVE in Jordan? Please rank from 0 to 5**

---

	Very low extent			Very high extent		
Recent restrictions on civil society posed by laws such as the 2015 AntiTerror Law	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Competition for funds and visibility among civil society organizations	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Lack of social participation and engagement	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Lack of funding for long-term programmes	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
The use of the term of VE	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Lack of support by authorities to civil society initiatives when it comes to PVE	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Others: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

---

**Q7. Do you consider coalitions of civil society organizations to be a useful tool to overcome civil society challenges in Jordan?**

---

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

---

**Q8. To what extent do the work performed by the following actors has a real impact on the ability of your organization to carry out its work and projects on C/PVE?**

---

	Very little impact			Very high impact		
Government	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
UN	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
EU	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
International NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Jordanian NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Community Groups working in PVE (Religious leaders, community leaders, local governments)	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Others: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

# BLOCK 3

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PREVENTION OF  
VIOLENT EXTREMISM (OPEV) IN JORDAN

## VISIBILITY

**Q9. Do you know what is the Observatory to Prevent Extremist Violence in Jordan (OPEV)?**

- ☐ Yes  
☐ No

**IF YES, ANSWER TO ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, IF NOT, ANSWER ONLY QUESTIONS 11 AND 13**

**Q10. To what extent do you consider OPEV Jordan as an actor of reference when it comes to addressing PVE in Jordan? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

Very low extent							Very high extent
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5		

**Q11. To what extent do you regard each of the following organizations (OPEV Jordan's members) as to be a reference for PVE efforts in Jordan? Please, rank from 0 to 5**

	Very low extent						Very high extent	
ARDD- Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Jordan National Commission for Women	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
East and West Centre for Sustainable Development	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Penal Reform International	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Durrat Al Manal for Development and Training	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Shoman Foundation and Leaders of Tomorrow	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
NOVACT Institute for Nonviolent Action	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	

---

**Q12. Does your organization have any type of interaction or relation with OPEV Jordan? If yes, how would you define your relation with OPEV? Please, rank from 0 to 5.**

---

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Highly Competitive			Highly Cooperative		
<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

---

**Q13. Does your organization hold any type of relation with any of the following organizations (OPEV Jordan's members)? If so, please, mark with an X those with which your organization has a relation and then indicate the extent to which the relation with it is competitive or cooperative?**

---

	Relation	Highly Competitive			Highly Cooperative		
ARDD- Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development		<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Jordan National Commission for Women		<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
East and West Centre for Sustainable Development		<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Penal Reform International		<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Durrat Al Manal for Development and Training		<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
Shoman Foundation and Leaders of Tomorrow		<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5
NOVACT Institute for Nonviolent Action		<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5



**You have successfully completed the questionnaire. Thank you very much for your time.**

# Annex 6

Main Points from Interviews with Network Experts



## INTERVIEWS WITH EXPERTS

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This section provides with the main insights obtained from the interviews carried out on 20th April 2018 with key network experts, which have served the network's assessment and the recommendations' development.

### Interview with Carina Soriano

*IEMed Anna Lindh Foundation (FAL) Coordinator in Spain*

#### Main insights:

- The **objective** of being part of the network needs to be the project, working in network to make the most of synergies, not funding.
- There is an annual **confirmation of adhesion** to the network from all the members to make sure all members want to be part of the network. It is better to have less members but that are really committed.
- Small and large members can make different contributions, there has to be a balance.
- Regarding **governance and decision-making**, the FAL network counts with a three-year elected Executive Committee which is in charge of organizing an annual conference in which training sessions are provided and a recap of the year including what has been done, what new objectives have to be set or what is it needed to improve is discussed. Having a Committee to which all members can present their candidature allows all members to have the opportunity to participate in the coordination of the network and avoid unilateral decisions from a leader.
- A minimum **funding** is needed in order to have in place the minimum infrastructure for the well-functioning of the network.
- Regarding **internal communication**, presential meetings are really important to enhance personal contact between the members. Something that works well is to create working groups for certain topics, for instance in the FAL network, thematic google groups were created in order for the members to help each other and coordinate on the issues they all have interest on.

- For **external communication** there should be an interactive website. Editing a digital newsletter is also a good idea to keep other members and subscribers updated with the network members' activities.
- To enhance **cohesion**, it is a good idea to put in place some kind of mobility program in which some members can participate in activities organized by other members of the network.

## Interview with Aleksandra Chmielewska

*EuroMeSCo project coordinator*

### Main insights:

- As for the **strategy**, it is useful to set up a Strategic plan in the long term, four years, and then adapt it every year in order to ensure long term vision and coherence. For a delicate political context, it could be useful working on resilience and exploring a strategy that adopts euphemisms in order to be able to maintain the network activities.
- There are always **imbalances** between members in a network. For those smaller, the network is very attractive. For the bigger ones, the network needs to make sure it provides them with benefits as well, reputation and visibility for instance.
- Concerning **decision-making**, it is useful to have a Committee that sets the general guidelines of the network and a General Assembly that proposes activities, topics for the conferences...to which both members and “observers” (organizations not part of the network but that have an observer status) can assist.
- It may be interesting to work on converting the network into a source of **funding**, by attracting funding all together.
- Regarding the **internal dynamics**, in order to change competition into cooperation, put in place joint activities. In order to **coordinate**, hold annual conferences in order to check the quality of the work being done. To increase effectiveness, clear tasks and roles need to be delineated, this is a work for the leader, establishing a workplan for instance. Workplans help as a motivation to check what has been accomplished and what needs to be improved.
- Rotative **leadership** is good but it needs to take into account the capacity of the members, not all members may have the same capacity and resources to act as leaders. The leader

should be the ones responsible for setting the annual meetings and events, defining the lines of action... It is important for a network to see the impact of its work, the **leader** if it has more influence can guide a common lobbying to achieve member's common interests.

- In order to increase **visibility**, the website needs to make clear who is part of the network and who is not, also setting up a newsletter for both subscribers and other members enhances visibility,. Moreover, OPEV Jordan could share it with other OPEVs.

# Annex 7

From Analysis to Recommendations



## FROM ANALYSIS TO RECOMMENDATIONS

As a complement to the detailed recommendations package (see Annex 8), this section explains what are the general recommendations per topic, and on the basis of what they have been informed. Therefore, it makes explicit the connection between the PESL, the SWOT and the recommendations, which are the outcome of these previous analysis. The topics addressed include: Members' nature, mission and values; Strategy, Capacity, Decision-making, Internal Dynamics and Perception, Internal Communication, External communication and Visibility, Strategy vis-à-vis the State, and Strategy vis-à-vis other stakeholders.

TOPIC	Members' nature, mission and values
GENERAL RECOMMENDATION	All members need to agree and share the mission and values of the network. Common understanding on VE and how the network aims to address it has to be reinforced.
<i>Recommendations formulated on the basis of:</i>	
STRENGTHS	Members' nature, mission and values
<p>OPEV has a comprehensive view on the concept of VE, recognizing that VE includes all forms of Violent Extremism. It acknowledges that VE acts are not exclusive of non-state actors.</p> <p>By working together, the organizations have more power in advocating for the paradigm of violent extremist prevention they are committed to.</p> <p>OPEV counts with an alternative framework on how to prevent VE from a broader approach which addresses the shortcomings of institutionalized power.</p> <p>VE prevention programs set up and implemented on cooperation with CSOs are more credible since CSOs have local roots, are citizen-oriented and led and are committed to enhance social cohesion and respect for human rights.</p>	

TOPIC	Strategy
GENERAL RECOMMENDATION	Design and adoption of a strategic plan for OPEV Jordan through internal consensus and in consultation with OPEV coordinators.
<i>Recommendations formulated on the basis of:</i>	
WEAKNESSES	Members' nature, mission and values
<p>Members do not share the same vision on which types of violence constitute VE (3)</p> <p>OPEV lacks an advocacy strategy that allows it to advocate for its alternative view on how to prevent VE (4)</p>	
WEAKNESSES	Internal Dynamics and Perception

Members have different expectations regarding what the network must provide with	
General perception by members of a lack of commitment by other members	
OPEV is not among the main priorities for all of its members	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Strategy
Lack of a Strategic Plan for Jordan though members regard that its creation would be valuable	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Strategy
<b>SUBTOPIC</b>	Strategy vis-à-vis the state
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Re-assessing the existing space for OPEV's action in the current political context.
<i>Recommendations formulated on the basis of:</i>	
<b>PESL Analysis</b>	Political Risks
PVE competences in a blurred area between the government and the Royal House	
Restrained political and civil rights and freedoms	
<b>PESL Analysis</b>	Legal Risks
Being criminalized by 2014 Anti-Terror law	
Finding legal impediments to perform OPEV's activities due to 2014 Anti-Terro law	
<b>THREATS</b>	Strategy vis-à-vis the state
Lack of a public official PVE plan, which leads unclear the role to play by civil society	
PVE at the hands os Prince Rahid office, linking it to securitized counter-terror efforts	
Being co-opted by the state	
Being marginalized due to state discontent	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Strategy
<b>SUBTOPIC</b>	Strategy vis-à-vis other stakeholders
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Extending OPEV's connections with other key stakeholders and integrate these exchanges into the network's structure and modus operandi.
<i>Recommendations formulated on the basis of:</i>	
<b>PESL Analysis</b>	Economic Risks
Many organizations compete for resources	
<b>PESL Analysis</b>	Social Risks



Inability to gain more space in decision-making in a restrictive environment	
Being rejected by local communities due to misunderstanding of OPEV's vision on VE (as if VE with religious connotations was its main target)	
Being rejected due to OPEV's vision on VE (SGBV, state violence, etc)	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Members' nature, mission and values
OPEV lacks an advocacy strategy that allows it to advocate for its alternative view on how to prevent VE	
Power disparities between stakeholders working on Human security in Jordan. UN bodies and INGOs enjoy strong leverage compared to local CBOs	
The reach and strength of CBOs in Jordan is generally poor	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	External Communication and Visibility
Lack of a communication strategy and a strategy of engagement with other stakeholders	
Poor visibility.	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Strategy
<b>SUBTOPIC</b>	Transnational Inter-OPEV Relations
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Exploring opportunities of collaboration with other OPEVs, enhancing the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of the network.
<i>Recommendations formulated on the basis of:</i>	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	External Communications and Visibility
Lack of a communication strategy and a strategy of engagement with other stakeholders	
Poor visibility. Lacking of basic technical instruments of visibility creation such as a common website or a Facebook page	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Decision-making
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Establishing clear and formal decision-making mechanisms that are inclusive and consensus-based.
<i>Recommendations formulated on the basis of:</i>	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Decision-making
Unawareness of the members on which are the decision-making processes	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Internal Communication
Mal-functioning internal communication. No formally established channels for regular contact hampers information exchange and sharing of knowledge	

<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Capacities
Imbalance among the members in terms of resources, what can create a diversity in terms of needs and goals	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Capacity
<b>SUBTOPIC</b>	Members' contributions
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Avoiding the expectations-capabilities gap by the adequate resources allocation

*Recommendations formulated on the basis of:*

<b>PESL Analysis</b>	Economic Risks
Lack of funding for OPEV activities	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Capacity
Imbalance among the members in terms of resources	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Capacity
<b>SUBTOPIC</b>	Common Funding Attraction
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Intensifying and conducting OPEV members' synergies and partnerships towards a further institutionalization of the network to become a subject for funding

*Recommendations formulated on the basis of:*

<b>PESL Analysis</b>	Economic Risks
Lack of funding for OPEV activities	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Internal Dynamics and Perception
<b>SUBTOPIC</b>	Leadership
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	The leader should act as a hub agent that facilitates member's synergies and participation.

*Recommendations formulated on the basis of:*

<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Internal Dynamics and Perception
General perception by members of a lack of commitment by other members	
Competition prevails over a culture of cooperation for some members	
Not well established group relations. Bilateral relations among some members are much stronger	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	External Communication and Visibility
Poor visibility. Lacking of basic technical instruments of visibility creation such as a common website or a Facebook page	

<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Capacities
Imbalance among the members in terms of resources, what can create a diversity in terms of needs and goals	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Internal Dynamics and Perception
<b>SUBTOPIC</b>	Coordination
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Development of a culture of cooperation and of the formal mechanisms to make it effective (both internally and regionally with other OPEVs)

*Recommendations formulated on the basis of:*

<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Members' nature, mission and values
OPEV lacks an advocacy strategy that allows it to advocate for its alternative view on how to prevent VE	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Internal Dynamics and Perception
General perception by members of a lack of commitment by other members	
OPEV is not among the main priorities for all of its members	

<b>TOPIC</b>	Internal Communication
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Putting in place the necessary means to ease the exchanges between members and keep them updated with each others' activities

*Recommendations formulated on the basis of:*

<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Internal Communication
Mal-functioning internal communication. No formally established channels for regular contact hampers information exchange and sharing of knowledge	

<b>TOPIC</b>	External Communication and Visibility
<b>GENERAL RECOMMENDATION</b>	Upgrading OPEV's visibility and reputation vis-à-vis other stakeholders working in PVE in Jordan (including state actors, as well as international organizations) and the general public in Jordan and abroad.

*Recommendations formulated on the basis of:*

<b>PESL Analysis</b>	Social Risks
Inability to gain more space in decision-making in a restrictive environment	
Being rejected by local communities due to misunderstanding of OPEV's vision on VE (as if VE with religious connotations was its main target)	
Being rejected due to OPEV's vision on VE (SGBV, state violence, etc)	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	Members' nature, mission and values

OPEV lacks an advocacy strategy that allows it to advocate for its alternative view on how to prevent VE	
Power disparities between stakeholders working on Human security in Jordan. UN bodies and INGOs enjoy strong leverage compared to local CBOs	
The reach and strength of CBOs in Jordan is generally poor	
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	<b>External Communication and Visibility</b>
Lack of a communication strategy and a strategy of engagement with other stakeholders	
Poor visibility.	

# Annex 8

## Detailed Recommendations



## DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS

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This sections provides with the detailed version of the recommendations classed by topics:

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### Members' nature, mission and values

- *GRI: All members need to agree and share the mission and values of the network. Common understanding on VE and how the network aims to address it has to be reinforced.*

### SHORT-TERM

1.1.1 Holding a meeting to discuss theoretically what are members' understandings about VE, with a particular focus on Sexual and Gender-based Violence as a form of political violence.

### MID-TERM

1.1.2. Developing a Charter out of members' consensus to describe what are the network principles and values in order to have a basis for Action Plan development, as well as relations with external partners and the general public.

### LONG-TERM

1.1.3. Becoming a stronghold of PVE (based on a broad understanding of VE), as an actor made up of diverse organizations with a unitary approach, both throughout practical experiences and knowledge generation.

1.2. Generating synergies among all the members taking the most of their differences both in nature (linked to the state, non-linked, international and local) and capacities. Diversity should become one of the main features and strengths for the network.

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## Strategy

- *GR2: Designing and adoption of a strategic plan for OPEV Jordan through internal consensus and in consultation with OPEV coordinators.*

### SHORT-TERM

2.1. There is the need that all members establish clear and well-defined objectives and expectations.

2.2. All members need to agree and share the mission and values of the network. The reason for membership needs to be the belief in the common project, in the idea that synergies can benefit all.

2.3. Since the network does not have any budget, it needs to be clear for all members that attracting funding is not the main objective of the network.

2.4. In order to transform possible competition existing among the members into cooperation, workshops in which expertise and lessons learned were shared could serve to create an environment of cooperation. It could be a good idea that the leader coordinated some sessions (one per member) in which each member presented its own work, sharing how it conducts projects, which problems do they face and how do they solve them and prepare an activity for the other members in which it would share its expertise. This would be useful since regardless of the capacity of the different organizations, all would have the chance to be protagonists and share their unique view and value with others. Likewise, for a short-term period, in which OPEV does not count with the resources to fund training sessions, this sharing of expertise and experience coming from each member would serve to empower and strengthen all the organizations' work. If the sessions are productive and the members feel it is valuable, further sessions could be organized any time a member had a proposal for a workshop.

### MID-TERM

2.5. If members are looking forward for further NOVACT's involvement, NOVACT could set some general strategic guidelines which then the members should adapt to their own needs and context in Jordan. Maybe this guidelines could be presented as a general framework for all OPEVs, and then be adapted by national OPEVs to the needs of their country in particular.

2.6. Creation of an Strategic Plan for Jordan for 4 years to be adapted each year in order to assure that the network has a long term vision and a continuity.

2.7. Creation of a yearly work plan to be revised on the annual conference in order to assess to what extent the objectives and tasks have been achieved and performed and if not, determine the causes and find solutions. The creation of a work plan can help both improving those aspects that does not function in the network and at the same time highlight the successes of the network and motivate the members.

2.8. Another asset the network could invest on is in the offering of training sessions for the members responding to their needs (members could be asked annually about what possible formation they might need), this would also turn the network attractive.

2.9. To further create a spirit of cooperation, once the network structure is more solid and a culture of cooperation is already in place, joint activities could be designed so that members have the chance to engage together in some initiatives. Since lack of resources and time are a constraint, the activities could be organized as complementary to the projects of each member. Though each member works on different areas, some of them can be complementary and interrelated and it could be a good idea to coordinate some of the projects.

## **LONG-TERM**

2.10. Since funding is not an asset that the network can offer, it needs to build its value on other aspects. It could for instance work to offer reputation and visibility to its members in order to be more attractive. Whilst for smaller organizations that count with less resources, working in network is attractive per se, the network should offer reputation and visibility so that the bigger organizations also see a benefit in being part of OPEV. The recommendations for creating this visibility and reputation are explored in the external communication recommendations section.

2.11. Some joint advocacy or service delivery could serve OPEV members to closely cooperate but also to advance their own goals by summing up efforts. This would entail a strong commitment and formal agreements.

2.12. One of the main strategic objectives of OPEV Jordan should be to be able to jointly advocate for their PVE vision as an alternative to the government approach in the long-term. All members should closely cooperate to advance towards this objective in a gradual manner. Strengthening and exposing the role and importance of the civil society should also be a strategic objective to bear in mind and for which alliances with other civil society organizations should be forged.



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## Strategy regarding the relation with the Jordanian State (adaptation to the changing political context)

- *R3: Re-assessing the existing space for OPEV's action in the current political context.*

### SHORT-TERM

3.1. ARDD as leaders should investigate what happened on 15 March when OPEV conference was suspended and share the findings with the rest of the organizations.

3.2. A meeting should be held to consult with all the members how do they perceive the current political environment, what have been the changes since OPEV's creation, and how they can respond and adapt to the restrictions on civil society work in PVE.

### MID-TERM

3.3. Since working on PVE in the current political environment has turned to be delicate, if OPEV wishes to maintain its work, a possible solution would be to develop an alternative nomenclature for dealing with PVE issues. Given the fact that PVE is very large in scope and encompasses many different kinds of interventions such as the preservation of human rights, strengthening resilience, empowerment or social cohesion, OPEV can still work on PVE by only avoiding the use of the term PVE and using instead specific naming in accordance to the project/activity. So even if the objective is to work on PVE, it can be publicly said that OPEV works on the protection of Human rights and social cohesion for instance.

3.4. Since when OPEV is translated into Arabic the word "Observatory" (/muraqab/) acquires a sensitive meaning that may difficult the work of the network, it may be necessary to change the network's name when translated to Arabic. That would entail, re-editing the Plan of Action in the Arabic version using a more adequate term.

### LONG-TERM

3.5. Being careful of neither being co-opted, nor putting at risk OPEV foundational principles, OPEV has to develop its own space of action in the current challenging political environment by proving the government that it is an actor with reputation and an international background that can make relevant contributions. If OPEV is a visible network with a solid reputation, it will be more difficult for the government to put obstacles to its activities.

3.6. Therefore, there has to be a strategy to revitalize the network gradually, gaining government's acceptance at least in the first stages, and once then network is consolidated and has a noticeable trajectory, act more openly as a watchdog.

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## Strategy with regards to relations to other stakeholders

- *GR4: Extending OPEV's connections with other key stakeholders and integrate these exchanges into the network's structure and modus operandi.*

### SHORT-TERM

4.1. Establishing contact organizations that have expressed interest on OPEV and its work, explaining to them OPEV's values and mission.

### MID-TERM

4.2. Once OPEV Jordan's visibility starts to be solid, the network can try to engage with other international actors or other INGOs with interesting connections (connections with the government, with some institutions or with other INGO's) and interested in working with local organizations. It can build some relations consisting on the exchange of mutually beneficial information and share its newsletter in order to expand its reaching scope. In the long-term, this moves can help the network to build its abroad reputation as a convenient partner and even attract funding in the future.

4.3. Building relations with other Jordanian local NGOs working on PVE. It may be interesting to develop an Observer status of membership within the network, to allow some organizations interested in OPEV's work to join the network in those aspects the members agree on (for instance, a specific workshop). Observers may be invited to participate in some activities such as the newsletter. That would foster a balance among keeping the internal issues of the OPEV only among the members (who strongly value the trust and confidence that exists among themselves and are not willing to widely open the network) and keeping the network too closed, as a selective club of difficult access. Observers could become potential new members if all the organizations agree. At the same time, having observers would enlarge OPEV connections and strengthen its visibility into new circles. This option could be

observed in the framework of the development of a Membership criteria mentioned in the enlargement section.

4.4. As part of the civil society, the network should try to expand its contacts throughout the Jordanian civil society working on other areas (such as justice, culture or education) in order to identify like-minded organizations to jointly work in some activities or to position together in some aspects of common interest such as in promoting the strengthening of civil society.

### **LONG-TERM**

4.5. In a long-term, if the network has sufficient reliable contacts with some sectors of the Jordanian civil society, it can ally to build a front for advocating together to expand civil society rights in Jordan.

4.6. It may be interesting for NOVACT as OPEV regional coordinator to foster contacts with other Euro-Mediterranean networks operative in Jordan (EuroMeSCo, Anna Lindt, Euromed Women), and see if there are some potential synergies in some of the projects of these networks. From the part of OPEV Jordan, it may be also interesting to contact with these networks' coordinators directly.

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## Strategy regarding Transnational Inter-OPEV Relations

- *GR5: Explore opportunities of collaboration with other OPEVs enhancing the Euro-Mediterranean dimension of the network.*

### **SHORT-TERM**

5.1. OPEV working sessions should gather representatives from all the OPEVs, to exchange impressions on the network, its work in the different contexts and define the network strategic lines of action in general, which later on could be adapted to the national OPEVs.

### **MID-TERM**

5.2. OPEV Jordan could explore the possibility of having contact with OPEV Tunisia or OPEV Catalonia in order to exchange information and learn from one another. NOVACT could play a key role as inter-regional coordinator and should define the channels for this interactions to take place.

## LONG-TERM

5.3. The possibility of attracting funding for common regional initiatives could be explored.

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### Decision-Making

- *GR6: Establishing clear and formal decision-making mechanisms that are inclusive and consensus-based.*

## SHORT-TERM

6.1. As OPEV is a small network, made up by just 6 members, decision-making by consensus is a feasible option. The advantages consensus entails in terms of generating legitimacy and ownership over the decisions taken, overshadow the possible disadvantages in terms of efficiency or decision-making delays due to long discussions.

6.2. Member organizations should agree in setting a timeline. Every year there should be an Annual Meeting to assess last year's network performance and define the goals and activities for the coming one. During the year, periodic meetings should be set. In order not to overcharge the member's leaders with duties and meetings, those may not involve the leaders of the member organizations but focal points in charge of OPEV related-issues. Member organizations should agree on for how long they want this periodic meetings to last, so they do not become an excessive time burden.

## MID-TERM

6.3. For decision-making by consensus to be effective it is important to develop an organizational culture that sets periodic meetings with clear agendas.

6.4. The leader could be in charge of proposing the agenda, send it in advance to the rest of the members and be open to proposals by member organizations of modifications and topics to be added. Then, the definitive agenda should be redistributed to the members. This way, ahead of the meeting all members will know what has to be discussed.

6.5. Ahead of the annual conference, the leader should conduct a survey to identify the expectations of the members and their needs for the upcoming year, and their perceptions about the last year of work. The results would serve as a basis for the initiatives proposed and the definition of the meeting's agenda.

## LONG-TERM

6.6. If the network was to be larger in the future, member organizations may decide that they want to further institutionalize the network as the increase in members may make consensus increasingly inefficient. If significant enlargement happened, then the creation of a periodically elected Executive Committee would be a good idea.

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## Capacity

- *GR7: Avoiding the expectations-capabilities gap by the adequate resources allocation.*

## SHORT-TERM

7.1. Some activities will require funds, it is important that when activities are proposed, member organizations make sure that the resources in order to foster them are also allocated.

7.2. Not all members can make the same monetary contribution to the network's common assets, but maybe they can commit resources in terms of time, human resources, or just becoming responsible for some of the activities, such as for instance, editing the newsletter.

## MID-TERM

7.3. Member organizations should look for synergies among them, and maybe some members can partner to ask for common funding.

## LONG-TERM

7.4. Make network structures and cooperation among members dynamic and institutionalized enough to receive common funding within the framework of a project.

7.5. The network in itself, if it becomes an actor delivering common goods in terms of cooperation, research, and advocacy, may become a subject for funding in itself.

7.6. Likewise, if OPEV Jordan creates links and connections with the other regional OPEVs, the possibility of attracting funding for common regional initiatives could be explored.

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## Internal Dynamics and Perception

### • Leadership

- *GR8: The leader should act as a hub agent and facilitates member's synergies and participation by all.*

### SHORT-TERM

8.1. OPEV Jordan has functioned with ARDD as a leader and leadership has been assessed positively by members. Thus, the same structure could be maintained but maybe the expectations that the rest of the members have upon the leader and its clear functions should be discussed among all members and formally set. This way both the leader and the rest of the members will know how to perform and what to expect respectively.

### MID-TERM

8.2. The leader in OPEV should be acting as hub agent, gathering the rest of organizations' proposals, and generating the environment for all the members to reach common decisions.

### LONG-TERM

8.3. If the network was to be larger in the future, member organizations could decide to create the figure of a coordinator, as an elected leader for the network, whose competences should be decided by all.

### • Coordination

- *GR9: Developing a culture of cooperation and of the formal mechanisms to make it effective (both internally and regionally with other OPEVs).*

### SHORT-TERM

9.1. Each member organization has to define a focal point to be contacted for OPEV-related issues (Meetings reminders, meeting agenda definition, consultations...).

9.2. In order to effectively coordinate, annual meetings covering decision-making, assessment and training should be established.

### MID-TERM

9.3. It is important to open the channels for recurring exchanges and transactions to take place. It would allow: deepening the relationship, generating “learning-by-doing” on how to work in network, encouraging member organizations to invest in relational assets, and fostering members’ interest to converge (what contributes to reduce opportunism).

9.4. With the focal points’ and the network activities defined, recurrent exchanges should take place in a horizontal manner and reciprocal lines of communication should be opened. Joint activities (starting by the ones on communication) will foster this exchanges in the daily work of the organizations.

## LONG-TERM

9.5. If a regular contact and culture of exchange is successfully established with any of the other OPEVs, the possibility to strengthen cooperation could be explored. For instance, there could be an annual meeting with the purpose of sharing expertise, lessons learned and finding common points of interest to eventually collaborate on some projects or initiatives.

9.6. Development of a culture of mutual cooperation throughout acknowledgement of common interests, commitment to a long-term relationship, and co-production in some aspects.

9.7. The improvement on coordination, together with the increasing knowledge about other organizations’ activities should foster the development of complementarity among the members.

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## Internal communication

- *GR10: Putting in place the necessary means to ease the exchanges between members and keep them updated with each others’ activities.*

## SHORT-TERM

10.1. In order to avoid having some members that are not fully committed to the common project of the network or in the event that any of the members changes its mission and is no longer willing to be part of the network, an annual confirmation of adhesion to the network

could be a useful tool to avoid having members that slow the pace or difficult the functioning of the network.

10.2. Regular meetings to favor personal contact and sharing of information should be established. As previously stated, the focal points of each member should be the ones engaged on the regular meetings.

10.3. The creation of a shared google group to serve as a database for the sharing of information would allow members to exchange of views without the necessity to wait for the regular meetings.

### MID-TERM

10.4. The creation of a digital newsletter with the weekly or even monthly (depending on the human resources available to edit it) activities, events and news of each member in order to build a sense of unit. Having all the activities compiled would motivate members as well. Each focal point should send the information requested to the organization in charge of editing the newsletter, which then could be sent through Mailchimp to all the staff of the members' organizations, as well as other contacts outside the network.

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## External Communication and Visibility

- *GR11: Upgrading OPEV's visibility and reputation vis-à-vis other stakeholders working in PVE in Jordan (including state actors, as well as international organizations) and the general public in Jordan and abroad.*

### SHORT-TERM

11.1. The creation of a section within the OPEV website for OPEV Jordan in order to bolster the visibility of its members and their work and projects is essential. It is important that it is known who is a member of OPEV Jordan. This will help the network to create an image and get to be known among other civil society actors, international organizations, and the same government. Starting to build a solid visibility is important if OPEV Jordan wishes to be taken into account as a relevant actor and be able to, in a future, lobby together for its own vision. Like the newsletter, some resources would be needed to maintain it and make it visually



attractive. In the website, it is important to make easily accessible a page on membership, where all the member organizations are presented with hyperlinks to their websites.

11.2. OPEV could ease the increase of its members' visibility and that of the network by publishing interviews, or other contents about them and their work.

11.3. A protocol should be developed in order to define how to proceed when one OPEV member is invited to an event related to PVE. Member organizations should decide if they set guidelines to attend as individual organizations or as representatives of the network. Ahead of the event, the invited organization can share with others the information about the event in case other organizations are willing to request permit to attend to the hosting institution. After the event, in the next OPEV meeting, the attending organization can share with others relevant insights.

### **MID-TERM**

11.4. The creation of a facebook page follows the same rationale as the creation of the website. The value added that it has is that the format enables it to be more active and get to be known by the general public as well as interact with other civil society organizations and institutions. The account should be open to all members' focal points, who could upload contents about their own organizations' work.

### **LONG-TERM**

11.5. Once there are well-committed resources to maintain the edition of the newsletter, it can be open to subscribers so that the image of OPEV Jordan is diffused and visibility starts to be build externally. The newsletter can be edited with MailChimp in order to detect to whom it arrives and who reads it, evaluating its impact.

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## Membership Expansion

- *GR12: Focusing on the consolidation of the network and exploring ways of gradually opening it to new forms of collaboration that may in a future become new memberships.*

### SHORT-TERM

12.1. In the short-term focus on consolidating the group as it is and assuring that all members share and agree on the objectives and are fully committed. If any member is not sure about the project of OPEV, it should be found out.

### MID-TERM

12.2. Once the network is consolidated and there is already a culture of cooperation, an established way of working, a strong structure and well-defined strategy, the possibility to expand the network and include some other civil society actors working in PVE that share the same vision could be explored.

12.3. All members should discuss these possibility and guidelines for new membership should be developed. The inclusion of new members should count with all member's approval and take into account the delicate political context.

12.4. A mapping of potential new partners interested joining OPEV and valuable for the network could be done.

### LONG-TERM

12.5. Gradual network enlargement, developing different membership status, such as observer status (only participating in certain activities), for members to retain control over the process.

# Annex 9

Contacts



## CONTACTS

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PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS	
NOVACT Institute for Non-Violent Action	
Contact	Position
Mar Benseny	Mashrek Area Coordinator
Marta Fernández	Country Representative in Jordan

MEETING WITH	
NOVACT Institute for Non-Violent Action	
Contact	Position
Luca Gervasoni	Co-Director
Mar Benseny	Mashrek Area Coordinator
Marta Fernández	Country Representative in Jordan
Inés Tlili	Training and Policy Officer Tunisia
Albert Caramés	OPEV Barcelona Coordinator
IEMed- European Institute for the Mediterranean	
Contact	Position
Xavier Aragall	Euromed Survey Officer

INTERVIEWS (20th April 2018)	
IEMed- European Institute for the Mediterranean	
Contact	Position
Aleksandra Chmielewska	EuroMeSCo Project Officer
Carina Soriano	Anna Lindh Spain Coordinator

OPEV QUESTIONNAIRE FOCAL CONTACTS	
ARDD - Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development	
Contact	Position
Maria del Mar Logrono	Research Director
Durrat al Manal for Development and Training	
Contact	Position
Manal R. Wazani	Chief Executive Officer
Jordan National Commission for Women	
Contact	Position
Sanaa Al-Banawi	Project Officer
Leaders of Tomorrow	
Contact	Position
Sami Hourani	Director
Penal Reform International Jordan	
Contact	Position
Taghreed Jaber	PRI Regional Director
West and East Center for Development	
Contact	Position
Mahmoud Hishmah	Director

The questionnaire for non-OPEV civil society organizations was sent to the following focal contacts:

NON- OPEV QUESTIONNAIRE FOCAL CONTACTS	
Identity Center for Human Development	
Contact	Position
Mohammed Hussainy	Director
West Asia-North Africa Institute (WANA Institute)	
Contact	Position
Barik Mhadeen	Researcher – Human Security
Dignity - Danish Institute Against Torture	
Contact	Position
Lubna Nasser	Country Representative in Jordan
Al-Hayat	
Contact	Position
Mai E'leimat	Co-Founder, Head of Strategy and Research
Mercy Corps	
Contact	Position
Natasha Shawarib	Project Manager
I-Dare	
Contact	Position
Suha Ayyash	Projects Director
Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (RIIFS)	
Contact	Position
Zain Fashho	Anna Lindh Network Coordinator in Jordan

